


JANUARY,  
1951  
Sixty cents

# MARINE CORPS GAZETTE



JAPAN

JANUARY 1951

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**Opinions expressed in the Marine Corps GAZETTE do not necessarily reflect the attitude of the Navy Department nor that of Headquarters, United States Marine Corps.**

**THIS MONTH'S COVER:** The GAZETTE salutes MajGen Oliver P. Smith and the 1st Marine Division, a fighting organization in the truest Marine sense of that term. Adversity is no stranger to this division; it cut its fighting teeth at Guadalcanal. And now at Korea it has written another glorious chapter into the proud history of the Marine Corps, this time with a bloody, frostbitten hand.

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## THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

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Maj James A. Pounds III..... Editor and Publisher  
Capt James R. Stockman..... Managing Editor  
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**THIS MONTH AND NEXT**—The GAZETTE has endeavored for some time to get articles from contributors actually engaged in, or recently returned from, the fighting in Korea. The first such article to reach us is this month's lead article: *The New Weapons Company in Korea*, by Capt James F. McInteer, Jr. We hope to include something each month on experiences and lessons from Korea. Next month, for example, the GAZETTE will carry *A Replacement Pilot Has Problems*, by Capt W. F. Simpson.

Also next month in the GAZETTE will be *Landing Techniques—A Look to the Future*, by LtCol Lewis W. Walt; *Aviators Should Fly*, by Capt Lynn W. Griffiths; *Leaders of World Communism*, by Sqdrn Ldr John Gellner; the closing installment of *The Federals and Fort Fisher*, by Maj Edwin H. Simmons; *Smoke Means Survival*, by Maj Robert E. Collier, and many other interesting features.

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# Message Center

## Artillery Characteristics . . .

DEAR SIR:

I would like to congratulate you and your staff for an excellent job on the anniversary issue for November. However, there were some items in that issue that I felt might stand clarification. We artillerymen like to preach the gospel of using artillery to the full extent of its capabilities but in the article "Marine Weapons: From Musket to M-1," I am afraid that you have credited field artillery with characteristics which they do not possess and may tend to confuse the uninitiated. Although artillery is mobile and not too difficult to move around, there is a considerable problem of handling the heavy materiel. Your article minimizes this weight factor and credits the 75mm pack howitzer with a weight of 341 pounds, the 105 with a half-ton, the 155 howitzer with 3,825 pounds and the 155 gun with 9,600 pounds. While these figures are strictly true, the weights do not include the weights of the various carriages without which the weapons cannot function. The combined weight of the weapon and carriage must be considered to give a true picture of the weight to be handled. I believe you will find the weight of the specific models of the above weapons (including carriage) while in the travel position is as follows: 75mm pack howitzer—1,470 pounds; 105mm howitzer—4,475 pounds; 155mm howitzer—12,700 pounds; and the 155mm gun—29,900 pounds.

Another discrepancy in the same paragraph is the reference to the 37mm AT gun as an artillery weapon. To the best of my knowledge, this weapon is, and always has been, an infantry weapon and issued only to infantry units in the Marine Corps.

W. M. MILLER  
Maj, USMC

## Flash Bulbs . . .

DEAR SIR:

I enjoyed the November issue of the GAZETTE even more than usual. The history of the Marine Corps is always interesting. It was clear and concise in every respect except for a minor technical error.

On page 34, the following appeared: "With the result that Butler made his entrance, complete with duckboard, to the accompaniment of clicking cameras and popping flash bulbs."

This was obviously impossible, as the first flash bulb was not perfected until 1930.

DONALD F. WELLER,  
PFC, USMCR

## Let's Go to College . . .

DEAR SIR:

I would like to second Lt Stiles motion (October GAZETTE) that officers be allowed to attend civilian schools.

Like many other officers I came into service shortly after graduating from high school; and when the war was over there were two things I wanted to do: Stay in the Marine Corps, and get a college education. Rather than give up several years of Marine Corps time to go to school I decided to stay in the Corps and try to get my education as I went along.

I hoped at the time, as did others, that the Marine Corps would adopt the plan used by the Navy in bringing their non-college officers to a two-year college level.

In 1947 I had the opportunity to ask a high-ranking officer at Headquarters if the Marine Corps did intend to use the program—the answer was no! The reason for the decision was given as follows: There are two types of education, technical and liberal. There is no need to send an officer to a civilian school for technical training because the Marine Corps Schools can give him all he needs; and the liberal education needed by an officer is afforded him by his everyday travels and duties in the Marine Corps.

In 1947 I was inclined to agree with that line of reasoning—now I am not.

If the Marine Corps Schools could provide all the necessary technical training we would not be sending officers to post-graduate electronics and engineering schools.

If a Marine Corps career in itself supplies sufficient liberal education why then is a college degree required before an officer can go to law school or an NROTC billet; and why were special courses set up at Cherry Point to teach math and physics to our flyers?

Reasonable answers for these questions are obvious, but the point I want to make is that it is quite possible for the non-college officer to find desirable billets and fields closed to him because of his lack of formal education.

Mr Stiles mentioned the entrance requirements for officers schools. General Order No. 73, the latest list, names 72 schools for officers. Of these, 20 require college-level education for entrance. One noteworthy fact is that even some of the strictly military schools, such as the Army Counterintelligence School, require their students to have a college background.

This situation might well justify a criticism that the Marine Corps, after testing its non-college officers and accepting them because they had college-level intelligence and the equivalent



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of a college background, is now restricting the development of their careers because they do not have the actual college education. The two actions are not consistent.

The facts remain, of course, that the majority of schools for officers do not require their students to have college-level education; and an officer who does not want to specialize in certain fields can follow his career just as far as his native abilities will take him. Lack of formal education need not hinder an officer's career.

There is another, very important point which Mr Stiles did not enlarge upon.

The Marine Corps desires in its officers a high degree of professional and intellectual curiosity—a thirst for knowledge! Manuals and guest speakers assure us that this is a prime requisite for good officers. It is likewise generally maintained, however, that military life does more to stultify than to foster such an attitude. This criticism is so general and of such long standing that it is always one of the first used by anyone who wants to find fault with the military.

This desire for knowledge is more likely to be developed in the atmosphere of a civilian college than on any post or in any military school. My personal experience supports this conviction. During the past three years I have been fortunate enough to gain nearly two years of college credits via night school. The results of this schooling were far different from those of my military training, which included the Amphibious Warfare School, Junior Course, at Quantico.

At Quantico I learned much about the Marine Corps and its amphibious role; and this knowledge has been valuable to me since then. However; the doctrinaire type of instruction, seemingly inescapable in military schools, dampened rather than encouraged the enthusiasm of those officers who felt they had something original or new to contribute.

In my civilian schooling, on the other hand, I found that I was constantly invited and challenged to do my own thinking. It was some time before I overcame my six or seven years of military training to the extent that I enjoyed and welcomed these challenges instead of being irritated by them. This type of education intensified in me the desire for knowledge that all of us have in some degree. This desire for knowledge has carried over into my career pursuits and, I believe, gives me a better chance to become a good officer.

I firmly agree with Mr Stiles that, if the Marine Corps would make civilian schooling possible for the officers who really want it, it would be of great benefit to both the Marine Corps and the individuals concerned.

EDWARD L. WALLS, JR.  
1stLt, USMC

## More on College . . .

DEAR SIR:

Lt Stiles presented the officer's side of the college question in the October issue of the GAZETTE and now I would like to bring the enlisted personnel side to the fore.

I graduated from high school and three weeks later enlisted in the Marine Corps. Because I have no college degree, about all I have to look forward to is an additional eight years going from my present rank of sergeant to that of master sergeant. That's counting another year for me to make staff, three years as staff, and four years as a technical sergeant (a conservative guess, I think). After that I should be able to go to warrant or second lieutenant in an additional six to ten years. All these years total well over 20 counting my previous service time—two thirds of my career spent in doing nothing more than obtaining the rank of a PLC or college graduate starts with! Thus I would be almost 40 years old and no further ahead than the PLC or college graduate is at 21 or 22!

Again, going up through the ranks without a college education, I would be lucky to go higher than major. Thirty years or more to make major, when the PLC or college graduate is bound only by his interest, ability, and other more intangible things. There are many who would be very content to be a major, and many, include me in this group, who are content only when their advancement has endless possibilities. Most of us relax upon reaching a goal and do not do our utmost. Only by having no set goal will we always do our best work. No one realizes more than we Marines that doing our utmost has never before been more important than at the present time, important personally, to the Corps, and to the United States.

At the present time there are only two ways for enlisted personnel to get both a college degree and commission, the Academy and NROTC. The Academy is almost automatically closed to most, due to the very small number of openings and the very strict examinations, especially the physical examination. The NROTC program is about the closest thing going to having one's cake and eating it, too, but, again, the physical examination, especially, eliminates many otherwise fine men who would make exceptionally good leaders and officers. Also, the age limits restrict it to those under 21 which eliminates many otherwise qualified and desirable men.

Suppose there were a way opened for the enlisted man to go to college more on his own than either the Academy or NROTC provides? Suppose there were a way for the man with a minor physical defect, not great enough to preclude combat duty, and who is too old for the other programs to get a college education and commission? The way would be opened for him to spend approximately 16 years as an officer that he would otherwise have to spend merely getting his commission.

Here, I believe, is a solution. The man would make his written application for consideration to his commanding officer, then upon his commanding officer's recommendation based upon SRB markings, conduct, and general officer qualities, the man would take a general examination to establish his academic ability (an examination similar to the GEDT for the college level). Upon passing such an examination, he



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
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would then be required to pass a more lenient physical examination. After successfully undergoing the physical he would be transferred to the unorganized reserve or given a leave of absence, on half pay. He would obtain entrance to the college of his own choice, subject to the approval of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, on his own. He would take some required courses, of course, but not as many as is required of NROTC personnel. He would be required to attend summer camps similar to the basic school. Upon graduation he would return to active duty at the rank held upon release from active duty and he would be required to serve two years unless sooner released, or if he is commissioned, allowed to resign. His grades would be subject to review and in the event of unsatisfactory progress, he would be disenrolled and required to complete the remainder of his original enlistment at the rank he held upon leaving active duty.

While this is just one man's way, I hope it will serve to start things moving, so that some way may be found to give those of us, who wish to make the Corps a career, the opportunity to be of most use to ourselves, to the Marine Corps, and to our country.

JOHN W. GLENN, JR.,  
Sgt, USMC

### No Longer Young and Gay . . .

DEAR SIR:

I have just finished reading the October issue of your magazine which I enjoyed very much. I am writing in regard to the article, "No Longer Young and Gay," written by Capt Kelley and Lt Louis.

I think that these two men should be complimented for their article as we all know that they are right.

For myself, I am interested because I come very close to the qualifications set down by them, with the exception of the 200 flying hours. I have about 60 hours of flying light aircraft. The only snag in the proposed program as I see it is that 200 hours is a lot of time for a young man going to college to gain, as we all know that private flying is very expensive.

I attended the PLC program this past summer and I feel that if they were to give the suggested program a chance with the same fine type of instruction that we received it would be certain to be a success.

I feel that there are many young men in the same boat, so if some of the restrictions were made a trifle easier the program would be a success because of the large number of applicants.

RICHARD FRAM,  
Cpl, USMCR

### Measuring Map Distances . . .

DEAR SIR:

Capt Watson's ingenious device for measuring map distances has been very well received by the geographers and cartographers at the Institute of Geographical Exploration of

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Harvard University. It has been posted on our map bulletin board, for the attention of visitors as well as staff members and students.

May I suggest, if a great many others have not already done so, that the method could be still further simplified by eliminating the roll-back process? A single traverse of the scale line, in terms of the forward advance of the watch hands, would give the basic conversion factor in advance. This, then, would be good for all measurements made on the same map; and a direct reading from the watch face at the end of a measurement would require only the most elementary division and multiplication to convert to linear distance.

Thus, if one traverse of the scale registers (say) three minutes on the dial, the reading in minutes of the measurement, divided by three, and multiplied by the distance represented by the scale line, gives the answer immediately.

This would eliminate the possibility of losing count in winding back and the probability of having to re-trace the measurement in order to get the exact setting. It would also reduce the probable error introduced with each contact of the winder with the paper.

DOROTHY FORD MAYHEW, Librarian  
Institute of Geographical Exploration

**Geopolitics for a Marine . . .**

DEAR SIR:

I would like to congratulate the GAZETTE on publishing the informative and well executed article on Geopolitics by Col W. S. Brown which appeared in the October issue. Certainly it will do much to shed light on the world situation and on policies which so influence the Marine officer's life and activities.

It is my hope that Col Brown will follow this piece with more on the same subject. The author points out that the United States, as well as other world powers, has followed an international behavior pattern based, at least in part, on the principles of Mackinder, Haushoffer, and other geopoliticians.

Sir Halford J. Mackinder described Europe as "a buffer zone between two strong pressures." He observed the threat of a large and ever expanding Russia opposed by a crescent of naval powers—the United States, Britain, and Japan. This ring of states, he felt, if unbroken could easily restrain a drive for world power by any nation within. Now we observe one nation of this ring virtually powerless in her own right and another whose power has since waned considerably, leaving the United States responsible to take on the combined naval powers' role if she wishes to maintain the containing line.

Gen Carl Haushoffer, who is in basic agreement with Mackinder, had a first hand opportunity to observe the restraining crescent when, in 1908 as a member of the Bavarian General Staff, he was sent on a special military mission to Japan by way of the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Indian



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Ocean. On this voyage he observed the British flag at Cyprus, Alexandria, Aden, India, and Signapore. These bases together with the home islands, Gibraltar, and Malta effectively encircled a great portion of Eurasia. He later stated that "it was with immense relief that we finally saw the flag of the rising sun waving over Formosa," this could not have been too heartening, however, inasmuch as Britain and Japan were allies at the time; unless we interpret this as a harbinger of attempts to rend the alliance asunder. It is of further interest to notice the observance of Formosa as a key position for the prevention of Russian expansion and to further contemplate its uncertain position today.

Haushoffer was present to observe the acquisition of another link of the encompassing chain, with the annexation of Korea by Japan; a move which he grudgingly observed as "masterful" in the endeavor to deny the oceanic riches to Russia and Germany. Here again we observe with interest present day attempts to sever the chain.

Mackinder did visualize another method of destroying the chain, this by any future merger of Russia and Germany. This, he felt, would create a state strong enough to disjoin the fetters and bring on an "Empire of the World," certainly a recognized goal of international Communism. It is not possible that this method has been eyed and tried by recent moves in Germany?

Thus I contend that, regardless of our opinions as to the righteousness of Geopolitics, the GAZETTE, by publishing articles on the subject, might point out to us why great importance is affixed, by certain nations, on places which to many of us may merely be names on the map.

JOHN F. LA SPADA,  
1stLt, USMC

### Emblem . . .

DEAR SIR:

With regard to LtCol Heint's letter in your August, 1950, issue concerning a Marine emblem as part of the permanent structure of permanent buildings and Marine Corps posts, it is my opinion that the suggestion should be followed out more extensively for all Naval construction.

There is one argument against it which, however, would not apply at a Marine Corps post and that is in many instances, particularly in Navy Yards, the tenure of occupancy of any structure by any department is uncertain.

For these latter buildings, I would suggest a portable but hollow bronze device which could be stamped out in quantity at a low cost if a sufficient number were purchased at any one time. These could be fastened to any existing wall (such as over the main entrance) and moved in case the occupants were assigned another building.

Incidentally, I would suggest two sizes of this stamped out device, one large enough to be adequate for a large building, such as a barracks or administration building, and the other for small structures.

For permanent construction on a post like Quantico, the device should be carved out of limestone, but I believe that would be rather expensive. I think the same results could be obtained and certainly more economically, by having the Mold Loft at any Navy Yard construct two dyes of the Marine Corps emblem in two sizes (as in the bronze above). Then with a fine reinforcing mesh, a concrete block of any depth to fit the requirements of any particular building could be cast. There are any number of ingenious finished to concrete these days (such as the finish on the Carderock Testing Laboratory, Carderock, Md.) which could be applied so as to improve the finished surface and make it more attractive than either limestone or concrete.

This suggestion for cast concrete blocks including emblems, has the additional advantage in case the original emblem deteriorated for any reason, it could be chipped out and a duplicate stone inserted in its place without too much trouble.

As I see it, the cost would be practically negligible if incorporated in the original plans and specifications as prepared by the Bureau of Yards and Docks and approved by the U. S. Marine Corps. To incorporate the emblem now in all present buildings would amount to a considerable sum, but if it helped to maintain that peculiar and valuable esprit de corps of the Marines (which comes to public attention only during wars) who can say that the additional cost would not be worth it?

R. E. BASSLER,  
Capt, CEC, USN

GTC . . .

DEAR SIR:

This is in regard to 2ndLt Joseph E. Muir and his question as to whether the GCT score in some of our record books measures our true ability or not. I am inclined to say that it does not. It has hindered my progress in the Marine Corps. I am in here for a career and nothing could drive me out but I would still like a chance to better myself. I was thinking seriously of changing my occupational field due to an overload in the upper pay grades and when I submitted my request for a different field by going to counterintelligence school I found that my GCT score was not high enough. After checking back I find that the test I took upon my return to the States in 1944 was the test that decided my score and was made a permanent record in my service book. Since then I have graduated from high school in my home town and also received a certificate from USAFI. I think men should be permitted to retake the test after a certain period of time if nothing else.

I would also like to ask a question if I may. How can I better myself if I'm not allowed to take it over?

RICHARD T. WOLFE,  
TSgt, USMC

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Loading and sighting the 75mm recoilless rifle in Korea. These guns were often attached to an assault company.

## The New Weapons Company

THE WEAPONS COMPANY OF THE MARINE INFANTRY battalion, as now organized, is a unit new to the Marine division and one which was employed for the first time against enemy forces in Korea. A complete analysis of the First Marine Division's combat experience with this unit cannot yet be made, and the scope of this article will of necessity be limited to a brief consideration of some of the experiences of one such company from the time of its landing at Inchon through the capture of Seoul.

The method of employment of the company's three platoons varied as greatly as do the capabilities, limitations and missions of the weapons organic to the respective platoons. A section of the anti-tank assault platoon was attached to each of the three rifle companies of the battalion prior to landing, and none of these sections was ever returned to weapons company control during the

entire operation. The mortar platoon, on the other hand, remained in general support throughout the entire period, with its FO teams attached to the assault companies. The machine gun platoon was employed with much greater flexibility, with one, two, or on rare occasions all three of its sections attached to rifle companies to meet specific situations both in the attack and defense.

In addition to its organic elements, the company had attached to it during much of the fighting a section of 75-mm recoilless guns from the regimental anti-tank company. These guns were sometimes attached to an assault company, but when retained under battalion control they always were attached to weapons company. This arrangement proved entirely satisfactory. Logistic support of the attached unit, as well as coordination of its fires with those of organic battalion weapons, was accomplished with greater ease than if the section had



In a fast moving situation the mortar platoon's lack of mobility dictates continuous selection of firing positions.

## In Korea

By Capt James F. McInteer, Jr.

been retained as a separate organization reporting to battalion.

The 3.5 inch rocket launcher proved to be a wonderful weapon in the hands of the infantry. It could be employed with telling effect against enemy positions during the attack, and at the same time provide the infantry with a potent anti-tank weapon. When five enemy tanks attacked a rifle company position one night, the "bazookas" put two out of action, knocking the turret off one with a single hit. The rest retired before any serious damage was done to the company. No other anti-tank weapons were employed during this particular local action.

While the rocket teams of the assault sections attached to the rifle companies proved quite effective, the flamethrowers were of much less use under the particular conditions encountered by this organization in Korea. The terrain was exceedingly rugged, the attack moved forward

rapidly, and there were no real fortified positions of the type most suitable for reduction by flamethrowers. This weapon soon proved to be entirely too heavy for a Marine to carry on his back if he were expected to keep up with the rapidly advancing front line companies. The flamethrowers sometimes had to be detached from their sections and returned independently to the parent weapons company. In fact, there was only one instance in which a flamethrower was employed by a rifle company commander in which the weapon could not have been sent forward on request to accomplish the mission had the flamethrowers remained constantly in weapons company.

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*Capt McInteer served with the 1st Marine Division in Korea until the division embarked for Wonsan, at which time he was ordered to the Marine Corps Schools. At present he is attached to the Combined Arms Section.*



The heavy machine guns in Korea again proved to be excellent fire support weapons in numerous difficult situations.

Even in this case, which involved the elimination of an enemy rifleman firing from a building, it appeared that other weapons at the rifle company commander's disposal could have been employed just as effectively.

One effect of permanently attaching all three assault sections to the rifle companies was to deprive the battalion commander of any anti-tank weapons of his own to deploy in depth in the battalion zone of action, or to use to thicken the anti-tank defenses in a threatened sector of his front. If the particular operation under discussion can be considered at all typical, the question which immediately comes to mind is whether the Marine infantry battalion could not be strengthened materially by the inclusion of another organic 3.5-inch rocket squad in each rifle company and possibly reducing the anti-tank assault platoon of battalion weapons company to two sections, both of which then could remain under battalion control a large part of the time. Such a change in organization would give the rifle companies the additional rocket teams they need, provide depth and flexibility to the anti-tank defenses of the battalion, and permit flamethrowers to remain with their own parent assault sections and still not have to try to keep up with the attacking riflemen who carry so much lighter weapons in combat.

The heavy machine guns in Korea again proved to be excellent fire support weapons in numerous situations, and the extent of their usefulness appeared to be as unlimited as the imagination and resourcefulness of the

officers and non-commissioned officers directing their employment. Practically always used in sections, these guns were employed effectively in the attack whenever they could deliver overhead fire, or fire through gaps between attacking elements. Such situations occurred frequently as a result of the hilly terrain, excellent observation, and the fact that attacks were carried out on wide fronts so that attacking elements often were unable to maintain physical contact between adjacent units. The guns of the machine gun platoon were used in their usual role in night defense, although the terrain did not provide long fields of grazing fire and the defensive situations frequently did not permit the laying out of interlocking bands of final protective fires across the battalion front. The battalion often attacked on such a wide front, and continued the attack until so long after sunset, that when it held up for the night it was necessary to set up all-around defenses of as many as five separate positions—one for each rifle company, one for weapons company, and one for the battalion command post—none of which were in firm physical contact with any of the rest. In such cases the heavy machine guns were employed in coordination with other automatic weapons organic to elements of the battalion, with due regard both to the location of dangerous avenues of approach into the several localities being defended and to the availability of sites for the delivery of effective machine gun fire.

Initially, in order not to disclose the machine gun posi-



tions and subject them to excessive counterbattery fire, all tracers were removed from the ammunition belts and replaced with AP rounds. This procedure did not pay off, as the strike of the bullets could not be observed satisfactorily and good fire adjustment without tracers was impossible. Much better results were obtained with the standard belt loading of one tracer to four AP rounds for day firing. At night one tracer per twenty rounds proved to be sufficient.

☛ THE GREATEST problem encountered in the employment of the mortar platoon was its mobility—or more precisely, its lack of it. In such a fast moving situation as was encountered in this operation it is essential that the mortar platoon commander and the weapons company commander and executive officer be kept thoroughly up-to-date on the battalion situation, that they anticipate orders to displace and that they be ready to move the mortars up without delay as soon as the situation up front permits. Furthermore, in planning a displacement of the 81mm mortars, it was found that a good procedure was to select three or four prospective firing positions, all located along a continuous route of advance, and most of them forward of the last reported front line positions. Then if the attack continued to progress rapidly, and the first new firing position was no longer within effective supporting distance of the front line companies by the time the guns arrived there, the mortars suffered no delay but were pushed right on forward until eventually a new position was reached from which effective support of the attack could be rendered. To operate in this manner, the officer in immediate control of the displacement of the mortar platoon had to be well briefed on the battalion situation and the projected plan of attack. He required communication, even while on the move, both with the battalion command post and with the rifle companies, and he had to be prepared to make sound decisions and act on his own initiative when unforeseen circumstances dictated an alteration in a previously stated plan for employment of the mortars. Delays in getting the mortar sections out of action and on the move as soon as there was an opportunity to displace, and lost motion during the displacement to new positions, invariably resulted in the mortars being out of action or out of range when their support was needed.

Communications had a direct bearing on both the mobility and the effectiveness of the mortar platoon. The SCR 536 radios proved to be so unreliable as to be almost worthless, although reports indicate that some other units were able to use these sets much more effectively. The supply of wire was inadequate, and was quickly expended. None was available after about D+5 except for what could be retrieved. Too late it was learned that a weapons company should not attempt to lay wire continuously in fast moving attack situations unless an adequate re-

supply of wire is assured. Miles of wire can be laid under these conditions without a single fire mission being conducted, and only a part of the wire so laid can be expected to be recovered. Then when wire is urgently needed, it isn't available.

If the mortars are to economize on the use of wire, a reliable means of controlling mortar fire by radio must be available. The SCR 536 radios may serve the purpose well in some cases, but it is certain that they cannot be relied upon. It was found that the battalion tactical net could be used for this purpose at times with good results. This required the location of the weapons company command post in close proximity to the mortar battery position in order that an SCR 300 radio could be readily available for temporary use by the mortar FDC. For obvious reasons this method of obtaining and adjusting 81mm mortar fire should be considered a last resort expedient at best, although it will work if all other means fail.

A better method was devised when three extra SCR 300 radio sets were obtained by weapons company. These sets were distributed to the FO teams and to the mortar platoon FDC, and were operated on the battalion auxiliary tactical net, or on other frequencies as recommended by the battalion communications officer. Radio then became the most useful means of controlling mortar fire. Once these extra sets were obtained the problems of displacement were easier to solve also, since the officer actually controlling the movement of the platoon on the ground, whether the company executive officer or the platoon commander, could keep in constant touch with the battalion situation while on the move.

The Comanche system was used to control mortar fire, and it was found quite satisfactory as soon as all observers and FDC personnel became trained and experienced in its use.

☛ SECURITY on the march for elements of the weapons company was provided in a number of ways, but often there was no really satisfactory solution to this problem when a quick displacement was required. This was particularly true during the street fighting in the city of Seoul. Whenever it could be done, the movement of elements of weapons company was coordinated with the movement of the battalion reserve company, but more often than not this was impossible. At times all or a part of the machine gun platoon could move with the mortars and, remaining elements of weapons company, in which case most of the security burden fell upon personnel of the machine gun platoon. At other times the mortar platoon, or elements of it, had to move up alone and all personnel in the column were then much too heavily burdened to operate effectively as scouts and flank patrols through mountains and rice paddies. Nevertheless, with the battalion operating on a wide front and



The 3.5 inch rocket launcher was employed effectively against enemy positions in the attack and against tanks.

the rifle companies advancing with wide gaps between them, it frequently was necessary to move forward along routes and through villages where no friendly riflemen had passed. In such cases, it must be admitted, adequate security measures were not always taken. Moving through the streets of Seoul, where installations far in the rear were constantly subjected to aimed small arms fire, the vulnerability of the displacing columns to surprise and ambush continually presented a problem to which there was no apparent solution.

To supply the weapons company with the bare essentials of ammunition, food, and water utilizing only seven jeeps and trailers, taxed to the utmost the energy and ingenuity of everyone concerned with the problem. The vehicles had to be kept in operation around the clock. It was found that nothing was to be gained by drawing a large amount of extra ammunition from battalion and establishing a company dump. This merely increased the number of trips the company vehicles had to make to displace the company dump, the rear echelon of which was likely to fall behind the more mobile battalion ammunition supply point anyway. In addition, the company sup-

plies which could not be carried in the vehicles on the first lift had to be guarded, and men could not be spared for such a detail without their loss being felt elsewhere. It was found advantageous to unload or position just the amount of ammunition reasonably expected to be fired before the next displacement, and to send to the battalion supply point for replenishment of this quantity immediately.

☛ VEHICLES had to be sent back once each day for one "C" type ration and two quarts of water per man. Sleeping bags and packs had to be brought up. In addition, a surprisingly large number of urgent special requirements for the use of vehicles arose each day, each requiring the temporary unloading and later reloading of the normal mobile loads which had to be carried.

It soon became apparent that, if its men were to be cared for properly, weapons company would have to continue to assume some of the responsibility for seeing that adequate supplies reached those elements attached to the rifle companies. In this respect the assault sections fared much better than did the machine gun sections when





Another view of a 75mm recoilless rifle as used in Korea. The gun supplies battalion with hard-hitting fire power.

they were attached to rifle companies. The assault sections being permanently attached soon came to be regarded as practically organic to the rifle companies and were never left out when the companies drew rations, PX supplies, water, sleeping bags, cold weather clothing, etc. However, the machine gun sections, which were attached and detached as the situation and the battalion scheme of maneuver changed, were often overlooked inadvertently by the companies to which they were temporarily attached when the companies drew the above mentioned necessities and luxuries. It was not thought advisable for weapons company to make any attempt to draw for and distribute to its personnel while they were actually attached to another company, but to insure that its men were properly cared for, it was necessary for weapons company to check up and satisfy itself that other units were not overlooking their attached personnel each time the word was passed to draw rations, water, or special items.

Prior to the entry of the company into combat there was still some question as to whether or not the weapons company commander should "wear a second hat" and be

given the additional responsibility of acting as battalion supporting arms coordinator. Once the battalion was ashore, however, all doubt seemed to disappear. It became apparent that this was a very logical additional assignment for the weapons company commander, and that that officer was an excellent choice to function in such capacity at the battalion level. Directing the employment of his company through constant communication with his executive officer, the company commander normally took station at the battalion command post or forward observation post where he maintained close personal contact with the battalion commander, the S-3, and the representatives of the various supporting arms not organic to the battalion. This method of coordinating the fires of organic weapons and the fires of the various units supporting the infantry battalion proved most effective. The battalion commander, in commenting on the operation after the fall of Seoul, remarked that the effective coordination of all supporting fires, organic and otherwise, had contributed much to the success which his battalion had achieved and to the relatively low casualty rate which the battalion had sustained. USMC





"... reinforced concrete walls four feet thick ..."

✻ WRITING IN THE GAZETTE, MAJ PHILLIPS D. CARLETON pointed out the value to the Corps of an anthology of case histories of small unit actions written by the junior officers who commanded at the time.\* Pointing out the advantages of such a mass of data, he also lists some of the difficulties likely to be encountered by the anthologist. "Time," says the Major, "has scattered the young officers and dimmed the memories."

That is very largely true. During the two campaigns I served with the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines we fought 100 small local actions the details of which have long since faded from my memory. I can no longer recall, for instance, who was on our left flank on Wana Ridge when we broke the counterattack of the frenzied Jap with the grenade and knife toward dawn of the second night we laid on that scarred and lonely slope. And I no longer have a very clear recollection of what transpired at that grim coral bunker which dominated Beach White Two when the first 11 waves of the decimated 1st Marines fought their way out of the bloody shoals past the burning amphtracks to take the beach at Peleliu. Most actions now past are like that—imperfect and fleeting impressions now lost in the dim recesses of memory.

And yet there remain a few fire fights whose every detail remains etched on the memory. I remember a fire mission that I observed for the *Mississippi* at Peleliu on D plus two. That half-forgotten action came to my mind as I turned over a page of *The Old Breed*—that superlative history of the 1st Marine Division—and came on a photograph of a Japanese blockhouse with the steel bars twisted out of the shattered concrete and the camouflage ripped away. I paused at that bleak and faded photograph and read the accompanying text,

"... the concrete blockhouse holding up the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, had reinforced concrete walls four

# Fire Mission

By Capt N. R. K. Stanford

feet thick and it was supported by 12 inter-connected pillboxes ... with the troops waiting out of range, the 14-inch armor-piercing and high explosive shells of the old battleship *Mississippi* breached the blockhouse and those Japanese soldiers inside who were not killed by fragments died of concussion from the tremendous blasts of the huge shells. . ."

And I was back again lying in the coral rubble of the shattered bunker in front of the blockhouse with the Nambu fire going high to my left and the Jap mortars bursting in the ripped and twisted coconut grove behind me. And once again I could see the haze of coral dust from the concussion hanging in the air and I could taste the stale sweat in my mouth as I looked past a jagged end of timber revetment to the indistinct bulk of the camouflaged blockhouse 300 yards ahead.

I was the naval gunfire forward observer detached from the Fourth JASCO for service with the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. When the battalion was hit and held up by heavy automatic fire from the blockhouse and its supporting pillboxes, I was moving up with "C" Company in the assault. I was travelling with the company commander at the head of the support platoon, with my scout-sniper and radio team strung out behind me.

The volume of the Nambu fire—at least one section of the machine guns and two or three other automatic weapons—and the accuracy of the Jap mortars which had impeded our progress through the coconut grove we had just left, pointed to a job for an FO. I set up my SCR-284 nearly at the top of an abandoned Jap bunker and crawled through the loose coral to look over a broken timber revetment at the top of the bunker. There were about 100 yards of shattered coconut trunks and scattered coral boulders interspersed with fairly heavy undergrowth directly to the front. The blockhouse was about 200 yards beyond the last of the palms at the end of a grassy clearing. The outlines of the fortification were indistinct in the haze of coral dust from our own muzzle blasts and

\*See Profession of Arms in the May 1950 GAZETTE, by Maj Phillips D. Carleton.

Jap mortars falling short and the building was heavily camouflaged against a background of jungle. I pulled back behind the timber and the radioman handed up the mike while the number two man cranked the generator and the scout-sniper squirmed up beside me, found a firing position, and waited for the Jap snipers to open up on our antenna.

"Ironsides," I said (six years ago and I remember *Mississippi's* code name yet), "This is Charlie Nine. Target at—(and I gave the map coordinates for a point 200 yards over and in line with the plotted position of the ship on my firing chart)."

Back at battalion and division CPs, naval gunfire liaison officers monitoring the firing net checked the target coordinates against the position of flanking troops on their situation maps and the Division Air Liaison Officer flashed the aircraft danger zone to the close support squadrons. The silence of the liaison officers on the net cleared the mission.

I nodded to the company commander and he started working his way forward to pull back his assault platoons who were in what cover they could find 50 yards ahead.

The gunnery officer of *Mississippi* came in loud and clear, "Charlie Nine, this is Ironsides," he said and he repeated the target coordinates.

"Reinforced concrete blockhouse," I told him, "AP one round. Main battery. Stand by."

The forward platoons had pulled back to our position and the troops were hunting cover all around the bunker. The Jap mortars which had been falling to our rear shortened their range and started smashing into the reverse slope of the coral bunker. Each close one blew me a foot or two down the slanting pile of rubble and I would inch back up to the timber on the top—I had not looked at the target since the first glance.

"Commence firing," I said. I had never observed 14-inch fire before and my stomach was tied up in a knot. What if we dropped one short in the middle of the troops? My scout-sniper looked pale.

The single round of 14-inch went over very low with a heart-stopping crack that nearly rolled under the smashing explosion as it burst beyond the blockhouse. As the round went over, I raised my head to look over the log and a mortar shell burst square on the timber.

When I picked myself up, I was at the foot of the bunker half-blind from coral dust and powder grains and my ears were singing. I put my hand up to my face and it came away bloody—my ears were bleeding from the blast of the shell.

I heard someone on top of the bunker calling brokenly, "Corpsman, corpsman. . ."

I scrambled back up the bunker and looked over—I had lost the burst and the Jap fire had increased. My scout was still in his position behind the timber but a

dead marine now laid beside him. My mike was still where it had been knocked from my hand and I picked it up.

"No change, no change, one round," I said. It came over so low that it seemed to fill the air around us, the tearing crash as it passed making the explosion behind the blockhouse seem insignificant. This time I caught the burst. Over about 200 and on in deflection.

"Down 200, no change, one salvo," I said. The full salvo came smashing past. Then there was a crash that shuddered the bunker and huge fragments came screaming back from the bursts.

"Holy Christ," I thought, half-dazed, "I've dropped one short."

"Check fire. Check fire," I said and I crawled back up the rubble to look over the top. A rifleman was already there and he was grinning through a three-day beard and the remnants of his camouflage paint.

"Right in the . . . middle, Lutenant!"

I was numbed from the concussion and it took my eyes a few seconds to focus but I could see that the camouflage had been stripped away and the shape of the blockhouse somehow altered. *Mississippi* had gotten a direct hit with the full salvo.

The riflemen were getting up and moving forward.

"Ironsides," I said, "Cease fire. Target destroyed. Mission accomplished. And thank you, Navy."

"Wilco," said the gunnery officer, "How's it going in there, Marine?"

"I don't know," I told him, "I'm a Naval Academy man myself and I should have gone to sea."

That was the third day on Peleliu. We went on after that, up a coral road to a ridge line and we dug in there for the night. *Mississippi* fired five-inch star shell and HE harassing fire along our front all night and laid down three or four barrages or Jap counter-attacks. I remember those fire missions in a vague and general way but the action in that campaign that remains clear in my memory was the blockhouse target and that third salvo slamming in like the end of the world.

"Time," said the Major, "has scattered the young officers and dimmed the memories."

That is very largely true but there remain for each combat man a few actions the details of which come back long after the rest are forgotten. USMC





### For the Record

It has been called to the attention of the Editors of the Marine Corps GAZETTE that there are two passages in that part of *World War II—The Acid Test* (November 1950 GAZETTE) that deal with the battle for Tarawa, Gilbert Islands, which are misleading when compared with certain statements contained in the official monograph published by Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps entitled *The Battle For Tarawa*. In an effort to set the record straight, conflicting passages from both the November GAZETTE and the official monograph are quoted herewith:

From the November GAZETTE, page 83:

"The Marines, on their part, underestimated the formidability of the reef (at Tarawa—Ed.) as an obstacle. Many had expressed concern over the probable inability of landing craft to proceed all the way to the beach, but this was not regarded as too serious; provided they could get part way in, the men should be able to wade the rest of the way without undue difficulty once a beachhead had been established by the advance elements embarked in amphibious tractors."

From *The Battle For Tarawa*, page 3:

"Early in August 1943, Vice Admiral R. A. Spruance came to Wellington to acquaint MajGen Julian C. Smith with plans for the Gilberts operation. No formal orders were issued but Admiral Spruance assigned the capture of Tarawa Atoll verbally to the 2nd Marine Division at this time. During this conference the question of the reef that fringed Betio Island was discussed and the decision was made by the 2nd Marine Division to use amphibian tractors to carry its first three waves over the reef, pending further experiments with the tractors."

From the official monograph *The Battle For Tarawa*, page 4:  
"Information on the tides and on the reef that fringed Tarawa Atoll, both on the exterior and interior, was equally complete. To reach Betio Island from the sea or from the waters of the lagoon, regardless of the direction of approach, meant crossing the reef."

Also from the official monograph, same page:

"To land its assault waves on Betio, the 2nd Marine Division had decided to use amphibian tractors (LVTs) and had conducted successful experiments with them. Later waves would have to go in boats (LCMs and LCVPs)."

From the November GAZETTE, page 83:

"For the LVT, conceived originally as a cargo carrier, was to have its first trial as an assault vehicle at Tarawa. Unfortunately, under the tables of organization then obtaining, the division possessed sufficient amphibian vehicles to transport only a small part of the assault force and there existed no pool at any higher echelon from which more could be drawn. It was planned, therefore, to land the first three waves in amtracks, which would then turn back and pick up additional loads from boats unable to cross the reef and shuttle them in from there."

From *The Battle For Tarawa*, pages 4 and 5:

"Early in the planning stage, when it became apparent that amphibian tractors would have to be used to get its first waves ashore, the 2nd Marine Division requested that additional tractors be furnished. The division had about 100 tractors, 75 of which were thought to be in suitable condition for the operation. According to Colonel M. A. Edson, 100 LVT(2)'s were assigned the division but they were still in San Diego and could not be shipped out in time to reach the division at Wellington, nor could the Navy furnish sufficient LST's to transport them. However, 50 could be sent to Samoa in time, and this was done. Trained personnel from the 2nd Amphibian Tractor Battalion were sent to Samoa to form a new company, with LVT(2)'s, which would join the division at Tarawa on D-day." (These 50 additional LVTs did join the division at Tarawa as scheduled. Ed.)

## Letter from Korea

By MSgt William G. Feningno

### AMBUSH

NOVEMBER 10, 1950, the Marine Corps' Birthday, 18 miles from Wonsan atop Diamond Back Mountain Ridge: We came out of our tents at 0630 and noticed that the ground and shelters of all styles were covered with frost. We were told then that we would move on at 1300. By the time we had finished breakfast the hill we were on was bare. When I say bare, I mean that everything that would burn had been used to warm us up and heat our rations. Now the word was passed that we would move out in 40 minutes.

Everyone turned to and secured his gear in preparation for the movement. Our column consisted of three Sherman tanks (two in the lead and one in the rear of the column), 16 trucks and six jeeps. Loaded on the trucks were the men of Easy Company, approximately 300 in all, counting the attached units.

The day was bright and clear as the column moved out. Some of the trucks were covered to afford protection against the cold mountain air. After going some distance, I had the top thrown back on my truck, thinking it better to freeze than not to see what was ahead. The other trucks followed my example, an act that would help to save many lives before long. Our trip was slow because of the "Burma Road" effect of our mountainous route, which hugged the sides of mountains. On the outboard side at times there were sheer drops of thousands of feet. The Marines in the trucks would look down over the sides and then at each other.

We soon reached a spot where an ambush had taken place a couple of days before. Overturned and burned Marine vehicles still marked the spot. A few more miles and we came to another place that looked ideal for an ambush. As we passed it, burned vehicles pointed to what had happened.

Our objective was now only four miles away. The tanks dropped off to the rear and we missed them. Another mile and suddenly all hell broke loose. Enemy automatic weapons had us in their sights. Men emptied the trucks in all directions, taking cover. Noses, shins, knees and hands were skinned and bruised but it was



already too late for some Marines were hit even as they jumped from the trucks. It reminded me of an ambush in Nicaragua where the bandits would hit and run. Here the idea was the same but for one thing. The enemy was spread out for about a quarter of a mile and couldn't bring all his fires to bear effectively at the same time. Our machine gunners and mortar sections went into action instantly and saved much materiel and many lives.

Our interpreter questioned a prisoner whose chin was almost shot off and learned that the ambushing party was about 30-men strong with a captain in charge. We counted more than 40 enemy dead in one spot. We took four prisoners but they all died of their wounds. Easy Company lost eight killed and 34 wounded, which was a terrific price at the hands of a very dumb enemy. Only one vehicle was put out of order, a jeep, and it was towed along behind a truck.

### Thoughts in Passing

Foxholes in Korea were made more comfortable with the arrival of the new sleeping bags. Everyone raves about his sleeping bag. Recommend that the bag be made about eight inches longer to accommodate the men over six feet tall. We have a lot of them in Easy Company. The zipper should go to below the knees so that a lot of them can get out of his bag faster. Because of the popular sleeping bag much money could be saved by ditching the old pad and pad cover which are bulky and take up so much space in terms of cubic feet aboard ship. The sleeping bag can be rolled into a package about eight inches in diameter and about 18 inches long. In combat areas where enemy infiltration is an ever-present danger, the element of surprise will leave a number of men dead with the zipper all the way up. I recommend in these areas that men be cautioned to leave their bags unzipped to their stomachs. Only seeing is believing in speaking of the dead men in their sleeping bags. Even under normal conditions one has to feel for the string before he can unzip his bag. Our word for the new sleeping bags: Outstanding.

### Illumination at the Front

We have found that illumination from the 81mm mortar is second only to naval gunfire flares and we sure like that. On the other hand the most disgraceful thing a fighting man at the front had had to witness is when a

platoon calls for immediate illumination and the 60mm mortars fire (in one case) 38 rounds before one illuminates. The manufacturer must be proud of those shells. The same disgraceful show is put on through no fault of ours each time the 60mm mortars have to illuminate, a good joke in peacetime maneuvers but not funny here.

### The Pack

It seems nice these days carrying a heavy load without having to wear suspender straps. Does a pack board have suspender straps? No! Then why wear them on the parade ground or anywhere else? The suspender straps do not help even if we add a hundred pounds of spuds on either pack mentioned.

### The Poncho

How long is the Marine Corps going to have the poncho? I know the poncho is not a tradition and it certainly doesn't cop any prizes for looks. I love the Marine Corps but I prefer a raincoat to a poncho any day. I wore a poncho 24 years ago for about seven minutes but have carried one since for many a sweaty mile. If you put a poncho under you in a foxhole they are cold and if you cover up with one, you might as well be out in a rainstorm. You can't use them for shelter because of the hole in the middle. We are whipped all the way around. Yes, you can catch rain water with a poncho but who cares about that in this modern Marine Corps?

### The Shelter Tent


Hand in hand with the sleeping bag in Korea is the shelter tent, when it comes to making a man comfortable. When I see a man pitch a shelter tent and properly ditch it, I see comfort. Much could be saved on not having the tent pegs. One must always cut a stick at least a foot long before he knows that with high tides, hard storms, or winds the tent will hold its place. Here are some don'ts concerning the shelter half:

Don't have one too tightly pulled.

Don't run your hand along the inside if it is raining.

Don't, if you are a young company commander, send all your shelter halves to the laundry so that they will look clean for inspection. They won't turn water again.

USMC



# And Now The Anglico

By LtCol R. D. Heintz, Jr.

ORGANIZED ASSAULT SIGNAL UNITS, IT SEEMS, BEAR much the same relation to the Marine Corps as some mens' wives do to their husbands—something they can't live with, but something they still can't live without.

The basis for this observation lies in the fact that, only two years since its apparent death (on adoption of the ill-fated "J" tables of organization), we have witnessed the timely rebirth—under a different label, to be sure—of the often cursed and much discussed assault signal company, or ASCO.<sup>1</sup>

Only this time we call it the ANGLICO.

"Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company" is the full title, and, much like the departed ASCO, there is one per Marine division; in addition, we have a free-floating ANGLICO attached to FMFLant in a status and for missions we shall discuss in a few moments.

But for now—what and why is the ANGLICO?

Beginning with the "what," we can explain that the ANGLICO is a company within the division signal battalion (itself a newcomer), charged with the performance of air and naval gunfire liaison and control missions for one Marine division. To those few—and the group was in truth few—who understood very much about the late,

maligned assault signal company, the ANGLICO will present few surprises, for it consists, with streamlining changes, of a 1950 model of the ASCO (less the latter's rather misfitted shore party communication teams). That is to say, the ANGLICO is a company level housekeeping and administrative "roof" which embodies a naval gunfire and an air support platoon, each of which in turn constitutes the air support or the naval gunfire package of a Marine division.

Because the ANGLICO, despite its different name, falls so closely into the logical history which characterized the assault signal companies of World War II, it is important that we look backward to see what the present unit's forebears were like. This necessity for background becomes all the more pressing when we realize that the wartime ASCO (or even the JASCO)<sup>2</sup> constituted a veritable storm-center of controversy and of no little complaint.

Taking them *seriatim*, the JASCO, the ASCO, and now the ANGLICO, existed and exist for a single broad functional purpose: to provide a kind of wind-and-water

<sup>1</sup>For a discussion of the assault signal idea's wartime tribulations, see *Minority Report on the (J) ASCO*, MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, July 1947.

<sup>2</sup>The difference between an ASCO (assault signal company) and a JASCO (*joint* assault signal company) was that the former represented an M-1945 Marine Corps evolution over the rather theoretical and not wholly satisfactory prototype JASCO, which, like so many military entities of a joint character, had proved to be less than workable when the chips were down.



During the last PORTREX maneuver at Vieques unit commanders were called on to solve tactical problems in the field against an Aggressor enemy. Here they view their next objective. Uppermost in their minds is the consideration of supporting arms. Which shall it be: artillery, naval gunfire, or close air support?

bridge unit (composed largely of highly specialized communicators) which enables the amphibious division to tap the immense reservoir of external fleet support during the critical hours or days of new-born battle when air and naval gunfire are the elements that keep the landing force on the beaches.

Among quite a number of oddities which have always given assault signal units their rather queer coloration to the orthodox military eye, is the fact that the company—be it ASCO, JASCO, or ANGLICO—never fights (and only infrequently trains) as a unit. Its only appearance in one place is between battles, for a Saturday inspection or pay-call. In fact the only reason the company exists as such is to provide an administrative and housekeeping neighborhood in which the separate teams and parties that constitute the outfit's *raison d'être* may live and conduct most economical, coordinate training.

The separate teams just mentioned are split 50-50 between the air support platoon and the naval gunfire platoon. The teams which belong to each arm are, at war strength, apportioned during combat, to all the division's rifle battalions; to each rifle regiment; and one for division headquarters itself. No additional means are at present provided either for reserve purposes or for special assignments to other than rifle units. The missions of the respective teams, both air and naval gunfire, are to control, coordinate, and advise with regard to the air support and naval gunfire support of the echelon to which the team may be assigned.

That, in outline at any rate, conveys what the ANGLICO is.

There remains unanswered, however, the "Why" which many of those ask who witnessed the seeming jettison of the predecessor ASCO during the "J" T/O hegira. It will be remembered that, during this period, naval gunfire and air control elements were parcelled out (in face of some misgivings among experienced officers) to become organic portions of the communication organization of the various battalions and divisions about which the "J" T/Os shaped themselves.

Why, therefore, did we promptly resurrect the assault signal idea, and create the ANGLICO?

The answer is twofold.

(1) The assault signal company, or ASCO, was not quite as dead as the "J" T/Os seemed to have killed it. In the current war tables the ASCO, in fact, survived all along. Even those who danced on its grave to the tune of "J" T/Os seem to have been unwilling to drive a stake through its heart by getting rid of it entirely as a wartime agency for service when chips were really down.

(2) The more impelling reason for renaissance of the ANGLICO was the fact that it became apparent that such an organization as this was fully as necessary in peace as in war.

The principal reasons why the ANGLICO (or some kind of division-level assault signal unit) remains (in spite of its rather unorthodox character) a vast and necessary improvement over any other expedient may be sum-





Close air support was needed to deliver napalm and bombs on the cave-infested ridges of Peleliu. Operating from a strip a few miles from the front line troops, the planes were able to respond almost immediately to the urgent requests that came from pinned-down Marine units. The pilots soon gained a familiarity with targets and terrain seldom enjoyed in other operations. The need for a forward controller was still great, for troops changed their positions as caves were destroyed or sealed. When aviation works close to the front lines, liaison must be excellent.

marized as follows.

(1) The nature of training, both for air and gunfire teams, is susceptible of mass-handling at a single level; moreover, the persons obviously best qualified to conduct this training are the division's two leading specialists in their respective fields, the air officer and the naval gunfire officer. Both of these functionaries operate at division level.

(2) When organic to the communication elements of the lower (infantry battalion) units, the various air and gunfire teams are not only extremely hard to assemble for collective training, but also tend to lose their specialist abilities and identity. About this time they submerge into the run-of-the-mine communications work which hard-pressed battalion and regimental communications officers never see the end of.

(3) Unless concentrated in a single unit, individual air and naval gunfire teams tend to lose doctrinal uniformity, and often take on the differing colorations of the preferences, not to say the professional eccentricities, of individual unit commanders under whom they constantly serve.

(4) Ideally speaking, a substantial portion of the annual air and naval gunfire team training cycle should be conducted away from the division, at gunfire and air support schools and bombardment ranges. This detachment of teams can be more readily accomplished if they are grouped in a single unit at division level.

Up to this point, we have confined ourselves to the ANGLICO which constitutes part of the Marine division. A while back, we spoke of one other air-naval gunfire liaison company—one which operates directly under Fleet Marine Force Atlantic.

Although the peacetime composition of this company

is identical with those in the two Marine divisions, its mission is somewhat different.

The ANGLICO, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic, in some senses precipitated postwar decision as to how we should organize our air and naval gunfire teams. Things happened in this wise.

✿ DURING the inevitable shaping of up and digestion of World War II's amphibious lessons, the Army disbanded its joint assault signal companies (the old "JASCOS," it will be recalled). These had never, for a number of reasons, been marked by great success, nor had they evolved as rapidly or as realistically as their Marine counterpart.

More to the point, the very mission of the Army (as a cadre force for mobilization and large-scale land warfare) makes it desirable that this Service not maintain extensive specialized amphibious formations.

For these reasons, it seemed logical that a non-divisional Marine ANGLICO be formed to provide air and naval gunfire liaison elements to support Army divisions during occasional ventures into amphibious training. This additional ANGLICO operates as part of Fleet Marine Force Atlantic's force troops.

In general, the effect of this decision was to bring about prompt organization of the Fleet Marine Force Atlantic ANGLICO. This unit, in fact, became the prototype unit in the Fleet Marine Force, and it has already participated, lock, stock, and barrel, in both the MIKI and PORTREX maneuvers. The value of such participation has shown itself, of course, in the excellent air and naval gunfire training derived and in the less immediately recognized fact that existence of the Force ANGLICO greatly enhances the Marine Corps—Navy reserve of trained specialists in critical fields.

For the benefit of the intelligent if tumultuous group who complain that nothing we did or were in the wholly amphibious days of 1945 any longer enjoys proper merit, it might be well to consider the charge that the ANGLICO reflects only the refined and evaluated practice of World War II, rather than any step forward.

In the main, it must be admitted, this asseveration is true.

Thus, brand-new though the air-naval gunfire liaison company may be, we might even now be turning over in our minds the ways in which it can be improved for present missions, adapted or trained to perform new jobs, and in general shaped toward the next, rather than the past war.

In a word—what forward steps can we expect or contemplate which will bring the ANGLICO fully abreast of the trends of tomorrow?

As this writer reflects, there seem to be some nine possible changes or developments that would benefit the ANGLICO of today. Adoption of any would represent a step forward:<sup>3</sup>

(1) Tactical air control and shore fire control parties have become unwieldily large. If this trend continues they may become unable to provide effective front-line support. We must point aggressively toward general reductions—based, however, on fully acceptable cuts—thanks to all-purpose, lightweight communication equipment.

(2) Every possible measure must be taken to render the TACP and SFCP of next week a readily air-transportable or airborne unit. Even the use of parachute TACPs or SFCPs should not be regarded as a contingency requiring extensive reorganization or re-equipping. The airborne mission should be regarded as one normally contingent to any FMF unit.

(3) A shore fire control party (and perhaps a tactical air control party also) should be provided for each tank battalion. Needless to say, this postulates the need for a specially equipped air or naval gunfire liaison tank, built to serve as an armored OP.

(4) In each division ANGLICO, there should be at least two additional shore fire control parties for “general reserve” duties—not only to provide much-needed trained battle replacements, but more important to give us units to provide naval gunfire support for the LVTA's, for the reconnaissance company, or for offshore spotting work in control of regimental or divisional direct-support ships.

<sup>3</sup>One change proposed in a few quarters, however, would represent anything but a step forward. It is the proposal by amphibious unsophisticates that artillery forward observers be once again (as in the pre-1943 days) employed as naval gunfire spotters, and the spotting team of the SFCP therefore eliminated. While this looks attractive from the swivel chair, it just doesn't work, never did work, and, if adopted, would, in the words of one salty Navy observer, “Set gunfire support back two decades, if not back to Farragut.”



On Oroku Peninsula, Okinawa, naval gunfire was used to knock out the enemy's casemated coast defense guns.

(5) We should look forward to and fully investigate the possibility of transforming the shore fire control party (SFCP) into a guided missile control party (GMCP).

(6) Along the same line, the forward air controller must prepare himself to become, if technology permits, an electronics guided missile specialist.

(7) As jet aircraft displace the conventional on-station support airplanes of yesterday, the forward air controller must increasingly prepare to assume duties now handled by the air coordinator. This will involve the addition of new and specialized communications equipment as well as a considerable broadening of technique.


(8) Finally, the Fleet Marine Force ANGLICO must not only be regarded as an adjunct to peacetime maneuvers or to Army improvisations, but, more important, as a pool in being of trained assault signal teams for FMF mobilization and for conversion into corps or force air and naval gunfire control teams.

\* \* \*

In terms of today's market for firepower, the air-naval gunfire liaison company is a better than average buy, a much more efficient package even than its war-sharpened predecessor, the ASCO.

Those, however, who know the pioneering spirit which has ever distinguished the Fleet Marine Force will be anxious that this unit—like every Marine unit—be oriented neither toward the past nor exclusively to the proven present, but to the future which—for the Marine Corps—looms so full of opportunity and so full of change.

USMC



# Marine Aviation In Support of Amphibious Troops

By Maj W. G. Wethe

"The Marine Aviation organization is designed to support Marine Corps troops in amphibious operations. It is a compact organization specialized and highly trained as part of an air-ground team. That is its basic mission."<sup>1</sup>

✻ THAT BASIC MISSION OF DELIVERING AIR SUPPORT HAS been considered a specialty of Marine Aviation ever since the days of the First World War. Between World War I and World War II, Marine aviators developed several "firsts" in the methods of employing aviation in support of ground units. Basic aircraft bombing and strafing tactics were fairly well established by the time we engaged in war with the Axis Powers. However, air support as we now know it was not conceived until well after Pearl Harbor. If the basic tactics of air support attacks had not changed, what was it that remained to be conceived during World War II? It was an organization necessary for controlling air support. As indicated then, the key to successful air support, for working closely with the fast and highly technical warfare of today, is the organization that is necessary to control and in addition, to command, apply and coordinate that air support.

Commencing with the operations at Attu and through the operations in the Marshall and Gilbert Islands, the Marianas, Palau, Iwo Jima, the Philippines, and concluding at Okinawa, the Navy-Marine aviation organization for the control of air support was in a constant state of

flux. At Okinawa, the war's last major operation,\* we had a senior air support control unit and several subordinate air support control units manned primarily by Naval aviators and operating afloat aboard AGC ships. Ashore we had a senior landing force air support control unit operating with the Tenth Army and subordinate landing force air support control units operating with the Marine III Amphibious Corps and the Army XXIV Corps. All LFASCU's were manned by Marine aviators as were the air liaison parties with front line units. A commander support aircraft, a Naval aviation officer and essentially a staff officer of the commander of the amphibious force, had operational control of all aircraft in the amphibious objective area. Air support of troops after the assault landing was either pre-planned the night before, for the next day's operations, or requested during the day. Air support, when available, was usually applied just as requested. That, broadly speaking, was the control organization and the system for applying air support to the tactical situation at Okinawa. That also is the organization and system that we have today. The constant development of a better control organization practically came to a stop after Okinawa.

Had we developed a perfect control organization at Okinawa? Now that the war is history and we have had

<sup>1</sup>"Introduction to Naval Aviation," Avn Training Div, Office of CNO, p. 254.

\*ED: Maj Wethe's article was completed and accepted for publication before the Korean conflict began.



a chance to study wartime methods of delivering air support, both in the Pacific and European Theaters, are there no lessons to be learned to better the organization and the system?

## OKINAWA OPERATIONS

☛ TO ANSWER the first question above, a reading of the history and criticisms of air support at Okinawa shows that there were still improvements to be made. The Commanding General of the 6th Marine Division made this comment:

"The basic difference between air support as carried out in the Okinawa operation and that which is desired by this command is that instead of having the ASC direct the strike group it is advocated that the ALP's be permitted to contact the airplane directly on the SAD Net, while directing a strike. If the personnel on the ground is not considered sufficiently qualified to do so, steps should be taken to place capable officers in these positions."<sup>2</sup>

That operational change has been made; however, the personnel assignment of the tactical air control party has remained essentially unchanged from that of the old ALP. This makes it necessary for the Forward Air Controller, the only officer in the TACP to act in both a liaison and a controlling capacity. Naval gunfire teams and artillery units, in comparison, supply both "control" and liaison officers.

Also at Okinawa, the commander of Task Force 52 stated:

"... an advance air support control unit must depend for target selection primarily on photo interpretation and pilot observation. . . ."<sup>3</sup>

The advance force of the amphibious force definitely depends on air reconnaissance means to give them information about the objective area. That requirement remains vital as the assault troops arrive in the area, make their landing and until they are fairly well organized ashore.

With the troops organized ashore, front line information is passed back by visual ground observers but there is still a great dependency on air reconnaissance which requires a definite air reconnaissance plan, trained photo interpreters and air intelligence officers. That there was room for improvement in these requirements at Okinawa is indicated by the comment of the Commander Amphibious Forces:

"Photographic missions during the operation were, on the whole, well performed. In some cases, however, there were indications that photographers had not been briefed adequately. In some

cases this resulted in poor photography and inadequate information dropped with the negatives or prints. In future plans, land-based photo planes should be scheduled for arrival at the objective area as soon as possible after the first fighters have arrived. At Okinawa it was found necessary to order forward an advance echelon of the Twenty-eighth Photo Reconnaissance Squadron."<sup>4</sup>

Note that it was necessary to send in an Army Air Force Photographic Unit.

The Commander of PhibGroup 12 at Okinawa recommended:

"That the air coordinator and the air observer be prepared at all times, if practicable, to photograph attacked targets for evaluation purposes."<sup>5</sup>

It is evident that a system was lacking to get adequate target evaluation photographs to the evaluating units. The suggestion that the air coordinators and air observers carry cameras was a good suggestion, however, the multitude of other tasks assigned to those positions would never permit them to handle complete photo coverage of all targets attacked. Also, their time on station is such that any photographs taken by them might be hours late in arriving at the evaluation stations.

In relation to the information that was received from air coordinators and air observers the Commander of Amphibious Group 4 had this to say:

"The observations and information reported by airborne observers and air coordinators were of immeasurable value. When targets could no longer be supplied by ground forces in joint operations, and requests for strikes were not forthcoming from the ground forces ashore, the observers and air coordinators often supplied missions. They were on the job constantly, and their reports were reliable."<sup>6</sup>

This comment shows the value of having trained personnel in the air to pass information to the command units afloat or ashore. It also shows the lack of a planned system to use this "immeasurable value" in applying tactical air to the ground situation. If the observers and coordinators could supply such valuable information in addition to their other functions, how much more could a combat reconnaissance pilot supply who was assigned the specific function of locating targets and supplying such information.

The Commanding General of the 6th Marine Division at Okinawa remarked:

"As phase III progressed a marked increase was noted in the number of aircraft available. In consequence, planes were employed in sufficient numbers to have a palpable effect on the progress of the operation."<sup>7</sup>

<sup>4</sup>OPNAV 34-P-0700, Amphibious Operations—Okinawa, p. 3-10.

<sup>5</sup>OPNAV 34-P-0700, Amphibious Operations—Okinawa, p. 3-36.

<sup>6</sup>OPNAV 34-P-0700, Amphibious Operations—Okinawa, p. 3-31.

<sup>7</sup>OPNAV 34-P-0700, Amphibious Operations—Okinawa, p. 3-34.

<sup>2</sup>OPNAV 34-P-0700, Amphibious Operations—Okinawa, p. 3-30.

<sup>3</sup>OPNAV 34-P-0700, Amphibious Operations—Okinawa, p. 3-34.

**Close support aviation reached the pinnacle of success in the Philippines and Okinawa campaigns. However, Marine Corps aviation has many possibilities for further development by following certain fundamental principles**

During the operations on Okinawa, fighter-bombers were used extensively to combat the threat of the Japanese suicide planes. As a result, air support of troops activities suffered. If air support is going to be effective in a ground situation, sufficient aircraft should be assigned to handle air superiority without drawing from troop support aircraft. Even if it does become necessary to stop a serious threat of enemy air power, support aircraft should be the last drawn upon and then only in those numbers that are absolutely necessary. The ground commander should always have sufficient air support available just as he should have artillery, and, in amphibious operations, naval gunfire.

The Commanding Officer of the USS *Fanshaw Bay* (CVE-70) made this comment:

"During the early part of the Okinawa operations our fully loaded planes, after being launched and proceeding to target area, frequently were not allowed to conduct an attack but were ordered to return to base, jettison their bombs and land aboard with rockets still loaded. . . . It is recommended that an area be established in enemy territory where pilots may, upon obtaining proper authorization, expend their bombs, rockets and ammunition on enemy targets of opportunity."<sup>8</sup>

Commander Task Force 58 made the same recommendation and later added these comments:

"Information on new targets was then furnished each day and picked up from Okinawa by carrier plane; however, no attempt was made to specify which targets were important. . . . It is recommended that each ASCU (Commander Air Support Control Unit) be assigned an expert on bomb selection and fuzing in order that the most effective combination be used."<sup>9</sup>

From the above quotations it can be concluded that the control organization lacked in having a specific up-to-the-minute plan for applying support aircraft to the tactical situation. They relied almost entirely on requests for air support made by the ground units. Also, when pilots had not used their ordnance, they were at first returned to base. Later, they were sent out on targets of opportunity thereby leaving the pilot the responsibility of deciding what would be the best use of his ordnance. Would it not be a better system to have a specific command unit for air support of troops that would have a plan and an organization to make specific use of every troop support aircraft available? As the Commander of Task Force 58 recommended, such an organization should include weapon selection experts who can help to select targets for pilots on station who had not completely utilized their ordnance for close support missions. It will be necessary to have these weapon selection experts available for future operations so that we can do more than merely make haphazard use of air in the objective area; so we can make the *best* use of air support.

The Commanding General of the 6th Marine Division had this to say about air support other than close support:

"Air support proved of great value against targets of opportu-



**Napalm bursts on an enemy held hill in the Mt Yaetake area on Motobu Peninsula, Okinawa. Air support was particularly effective in helping ground troops.**

nity in addition to the conventional support missions. In the field of opportunity target, much effective bombing was executed on enemy troop movements during the withdrawal from the Shuri defense line."<sup>10</sup>

That comment indicated that there should be a definite use for troop support aircraft in the tactical situation other than the supply of close support missions. How much more effective could that type of support have been if it were carried out by an organization trained to make the most effective use of aircraft beyond the front lines but coordinated, still, with the over-all strategy and tactics? That is, rather than having attacks carried out almost at random on targets of opportunity picked out by individual pilots, to have an organization that can foresee, and have a specific plan for hitting, targets that will help the ground situation the most.

The Commander of the Amphibious Force at Okinawa stated in his concluding remarks about direct air support operation:

"It is desired to stress that an Air Support Control Unit, true to its title, is purely an agency for controlling through communications facilities and personnel, aircraft supplied by other units."<sup>11</sup>

Those control agencies then were not intended by themselves to determine the application of troop support aircraft to the tactical situation but rather to assign aircraft according to plan and as requested by the ground units. The Tactical Air Control Agencies were not, of them-

<sup>8</sup>OPNAV 34-P-0700, Amphibious Operations—Okinawa, p. 3-35.

<sup>9</sup>OPNAV 34-P-0700, Amphibious Operations—Okinawa, p. 3-32.

<sup>10</sup>OPNAV 34-P-0700, Amphibious Operations—Okinawa, p. 3-37.

<sup>11</sup>OPNAV 34-P-0700, Amphibious Operations—Okinawa, p. 3-29.



selves, intended to exercise tactical command or application of a troop support program. Does it not seem reasonable that there should be a specific Air Commander to handle the function of tactical application of air in support of the ground troops?

The organization that was used at Okinawa was more specifically the outgrowth of Naval aviation command structure than it was of Marine aviation's command structure. As a result, except for specific application of direct air support of troops, it fits Naval aviation's needs very well. It does not fit the command structure of Marine aviation nor the requirements for air support of troops. It did not fit properly with the Tenth Tactical Air Force at Okinawa. In the Navy an air command above Air Group has a carrier, a carrier group or a carrier task force to operate in addition to supplying aircraft for an amphibious operation. In Marine aviation with the present type of control organization the Marine aviation general becomes a supplier of aircraft and a maker of recommendations only. He has no tactical command functions. At Okinawa over-all command of air operations never did pass ashore but remained with the Commander Amphibious Force for the entire operation. It would seem, then, that some sort of change should be made to the control organization in order to make use of the tactical knowledge of the Marine Aviation General and his staff.

#### PHILIPPINE AND EUROPEAN DIRECT SUPPORT OPERATIONS

IN THE PHILIPPINES some air support operations were carried out by Marine aviators in support of U.S. Army ground troops. Those operations require consideration because of the unqualified success that they had as attested to by those Army ground troops. Because of parallel developments it is interesting to consider those operations with some of the Air Force operations in Europe. A study must be made of the Air Force operations in Europe to find lessons to apply in present day amphibious air support. For, while the Air Force there was almost entirely concerned with land mass warfare, and mass application of air power, the principles of support by air are such that no great difference exists regardless of the type operation that is being supported.

In the landing on Normandy the emphasis of air support was on isolation of the battlefield. The preponderance of air power and naval power permitted allied ground forces to land against a potentially more powerful ground enemy. A similar situation, where an enemy could have potentially greater ground forces and still be combatted successfully by superior naval and air force in coordination with highly trained and specialized ground troops, has a familiar ring in the light of the present world situation. The isolation of the battlefield phase of air operations could be just as important again to keep a potentially more powerful enemy from reaching our

specialized troops in larger numbers than they could handle. Throughout the European campaign the Air Force continued to emphasize tactical air support beyond the front lines. The history of the operations of Gen Weyland's XIX Tactical Air Command, in support of Gen Patton's Third Army, is without parallel in the annals of warfare.

Possibly the greatest lesson to be learned from the air operations in Europe was that, instead of merely being made available to the ground forces, air was tactically applied to the ground situation by an air commander who completely understood its capabilities. He applied those capabilities in cooperation with the ground commander and the ground scheme of maneuver. The results speak for themselves. Command relationships in the Philippines were similar to those in Europe with a Marine aviation commander tactically applying his air units in support of Army ground units and in furtherance of the ground forces' scheme of maneuver. Again, results speak for themselves.

In presenting comments and conclusions on the employment of tactical air, a report by Gen Weyland's XIX Tactical Air Command had this to say about emphasis of air attacks:

"The amount of close cooperation rendered to ground forces is directly proportional to the speed of the advance."<sup>12</sup>

In other words, make the most use of the mobility of

<sup>12</sup>XIX Tactical Air Command, Tactical Air Operations in Europe, p. 1.

In the Philippines Marine aviation played an outstanding role. Support of the 1st Cavalry Division's drive to Manila brought new recognition and praise.





aircraft by applying them to a fluid situation where mobility is the greatest asset. The same lesson was learned and applied in the Philippines by Marine Air Groups 23 and 32 under Col C. C. Jerome. A write up of those operations includes the following:

"The real chance to prove the worth of close support came on 1 February (1945) when the Groups began providing air alerts of nine planes from dawn to dusk over the 1st Cavalry Division on its historic sweep toward Manila. It is believed that this was the first time in the Pacific Theater that planes covered an armored column continuously and one of the few examples of real air-ground teamwork in the war."<sup>13</sup>

An examination of operations shows that the Marine aviators here were running into and solving problems, although on a smaller scale, in almost exactly the same manner as did the XIX TAC in Europe.

In addition to this parallel with operational lessons in Europe, however, Marine Air Groups 12 and 32 at Zamboanga with the Army's 41st Division made a specialty of close air support missions. A report of their operations there states:

"The same tactics as employed in Luzon were used and Marine air liaison parties controlled the strikes. In this respect the operations were greatly facilitated as it was only a mile or two from the airfield to the targets and it was possible to take the flight leaders, intelligence officers and air liaison party personnel right to the front lines to tee up the strike with the ground force commander and the artillery forward observer. Here again cooperation and coordination paid big dividends. . . ."<sup>14</sup>

Notice that Marine aviation here was using the ALPs to control strikes, a development not accepted by other Pacific units until after the war. While the Zamboanga operation was comparatively small, allowing such close cooperation, there is no reason why a system couldn't be evolved for larger operations that would still give the good results obtained from such a close interchange of information and requests. The principle involved is as stated in the conclusion of the report of Marine air operations with the Army in the Philippines:

"The cardinal principle or axiom to continually bear in mind is that the secret of the entire operation is close coordination between units and thorough cooperation on the part of all parties involved."<sup>15</sup>

The XIX Tactical Air Command in Europe was particularly pointed about having reconnaissance means immediately available for its operations. Comments and conclusions by that command state:

"The present practice of assigning a tactical reconnaissance group to each tactical air command is heartily endorsed. Direct and close control of a reconnaissance group, including both photo and visual reconnaissance as well as artillery adjustment, is absolutely essential to the proper operation of a tactical air command co-operating with an army. Without such control it would be impossible to achieve the swift and close air-ground cooperation which means success in battle."<sup>16</sup>

And again:

"Control of reconnaissance by the tactical air command permits

<sup>13</sup>Close Support Aviation, MAG-24 Operations Officer, p. 12.

<sup>14</sup>Close Support Aviation, MAG-24 Operations Officer, p. 14.

<sup>15</sup>Close Support Aviation, MAG-24 Operations Officer, p. 16.

<sup>16</sup>XIX Tactical Air Command, Tactical Air Operations in Europe, p. 1.

its operation from bases well forward, with resultant increased range and greater accessibility to the principal users of the intelligence and photographs obtained."<sup>17</sup>

By comparison with this, the Marines in the Philippines found a sad lack of reconnaissance means. Their report states:

"Maps in general were not suitable. They were not of a suitable scale and the number required to be carried by a pilot became so cumbersome that they were resorted to only for navigation and general orientation. Photos were generally good when available but this was not often. Guerrilla sketches were usually excellent and reliable and when used in conjunction with photos proved very satisfactory."<sup>18</sup>

Fortunately, much of the work of the Philippine air groups was in close support where visual direction from the ground helped pilots to find targets.

The Marine aerial photography program was small throughout the war as indicated by an article in the November, 1949, Marine Corps GAZETTE by Maj Jack C. McDermott entitled, *Lets Really Use Marine Photography*. In that article Maj McDermott bemoaned the fact that the Marines had done so little in aerial photography during the war but took some encouragement from the fact that two photo squadrons, VMP-354 and VMP-254, had been revived in 1947 and by 1949 were almost full strength. If the Major is cracking his knuckles over the present state of affairs regarding Marine aerial photographic units he certainly has cause to do so. The need for Marine aviation photographic squadrons, while maybe not so obvious in peacetime operations, will be vital in a war time situation.


The use of intelligence from aerial reconnaissance and other sources to keep pilots informed can be very helpful as affirmed by the XIX TAC in Europe:

"Early in the campaign the A-2 Section initiated its 'Briefing Notes for Group and Squadron S-2s', a daily teletype giving the latest information on enemy movements, order of battle, and changes of flak dispositions, pointing out significant trends and pinpointing targets of opportunity. . . . Group and squadron commanders and S-2s reported that it formed a valuable supplement to the field order, laying before them the current picture as seen at Headquarters and thus enabling them to carry out their operations with full understanding and coordination."<sup>19</sup>

<sup>17</sup>XIX Tactical Air Command, Tactical Air Operations in Europe, p. 2.

<sup>18</sup>Close Support Aviation, MAG-24 Operations Officer, p. 11.

<sup>19</sup>XIX Tactical Air Command, Tactical Air Operations in Europe, p. 30.



A system for collection of air intelligence from aerial reconnaissance and other means, its collation, and dissemination both to high command for making decisions and planning future action and to groups and squadrons for their effective coordination into the over-all plan, can not be emphasized too highly.

## REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL AIR SUPPORT OF THE GROUND SCHEME OF MANEUVER

IN THE LIGHT of these lessons learned by combat units of the last war, what are the requirements for a successful system for air support of troops to fit the mission of amphibious operations?

### Command

The first requirement, as it is in any other military combat situation is tactical command. There must be unity and continuity of tactical command for every troop support mission carried out by air in an amphibious objective area. It must begin with the conception of an operation and carry through the planning, rehearsal, prelanding, assault and consolidation phases of that operation. The commander for the entire air-support-of-troops-operation must be thoroughly familiar with carrier aircraft operations, the amphibious operation, troop operations and land based air operations. He must be a specialist in tactical air support of troops. He should have a title like *Tactical Air Support Commander*. In order to have an organization that will be capable of delivering the troop support required in an amphibious operation the tactical air support commander must be able to train pilots to fit the need. The units that will provide troop air support must be under his command before the operation, during the operation and after the operation. The later is necessary so he can direct the changes that must be made due to new techniques that develop during the operation.

### Application

The tactical air support commander must exercise direct tactical application of the units in that command to get the best possible air support of troops. Air must not be wasted by just being made available. It must be tactically

applied as a military unit. It must be applied not only in close support of troops but, within and around the amphibious objective area, everywhere that it can be economically and profitably used to support troop operations. Extensive use is made of air to prepare the landing area for the assault landing troops. That principle of preparation by air should be continued just as extensively throughout the entire operation. Coexistent with and indispensable to that tactical application are the means of reconnaissance and the intelligence organization necessary to interpret the results of reconnaissance, which interpretation the commander must have to make his decisions. An aviation intelligence organization must have access to all sources of intelligence information and must have the means to disseminate air reconnaissance information to all units concerned. In order to permit command to tactically apply the capability of speed and mobility peculiar to air, the air intelligence organization must be particularly far-sighted and capable of extremely fast action. It must be under the command of the tactical air support commander.

### Coordination

In these days of highly specialized warfare no military specialty is capable of existing or operating effectively alone. Coordination is absolutely essential. Air must be tactically applied in coordination with the scheme of ground maneuver. The scheme of ground maneuver should be planned to make the most use of the capabilities of air. Those air operations in close support of troops must be coordinated with artillery and naval gunfire. Coordination must also be had among the various air units operating in the area. With all this coordination, emphasis must be placed on active cooperation. Understanding of the other military units' problems is a invaluable aid. This cooperation and coordination requires an effective liaison system from air units to supported units and from supported units to air units.

### Control

For a command to make an effective application of air support it is necessary for it to have a system for control. Because of the importance of time in relation to air support operations the system for control and direction of support aircraft must be under the *immediate* supervision of that command. All troop support aircraft in the objective area should be controlled through the same central agency but it should be possible to delegate that control to lesser echelons where and when practicable. Radar type control is becoming more important for night and bad weather operations and is particularly important

← XIX TAC fighters accounted for this destroyed mechanized column and helped to close the Falaise-Argentan trap on retreating Germans in Normandy.




when the enemy has aircraft that might oppose the operation. In amphibious operations on land masses the land based radar units soon become more important than radar units on naval vessels and equal emphasis should be put on its advanced design. Radio communications are of primary importance in control of troop air support and where possible, there should be other parallel mediums of communication in addition to the maximum number of radio channels. The air intelligence agency should be closely connected with the control organization and the personnel in both should be entirely familiar with air support operations and the operations of the units to be supported. Control as well as command of troop air support operations should be passed ashore as soon as possible in amphibious operations to permit better coordination, communications and cooperation with the troop units. Effective means of close support control should be available to as small a troop organization as can successfully utilize the capabilities of air support. A system must be made available to quickly pass control of support aircraft to air coordinators working in general support beyond front lines to permit the direction of those aircraft on targets located by such an air coordinator. Such a system should be capable of making the most use of the speed, maneuverability, mobility and flexibility of air.

#### HOW DOES MARINE AVIATION FULFILL THESE REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL AIR SUPPORT?

##### Command

☛ IN THE LIGHT of the above listed requirements for successful air support of troops, as determined by successful wartime operations, how does our present Marine aviation support system compare?

Considering first the requirements of a tactical air support commander for amphibious operations, it is obvious that a senior Marine aviator is best qualified. He is thoroughly familiar with carrier air operations, land based air operations, amphibious operations and troop operations—as is no other service aviator. However, even with the present concept of Marine aviation's basic mission as stated at the beginning of this article, there is no provision made for a senior Marine aviator to exercise a tactical command function in an amphibious operation until possibly well after the assault landing has been made. This is due initially to the system of putting Marine squadrons aboard carriers but making no provision for the senior Marine aviation commands of group and wing. It is due, also, to the fact that no specific planning or command function is assigned to the senior Marine aviator in the tactical air command of the amphibious force, during the pre-landing and assault phases of the amphibious operation. As a result, during the initial phases of such an operation, the senior Marine air command becomes a logistics support and



administrative unit only. Proper use is not being made of the tactical training and experience of Marine aviation colonels and generals. Theoretically, the tactical air command would pass ashore some time after the assault landing. Marine aviation, then, might have tactical command in the consolidation phase, that is, if the Air Force has not been sufficiently well established ashore to take tactical air command itself.


##### Application

If Marine aviation cannot have combat tactical command it certainly cannot exercise combat tactical application of its air power. The fact that Marine aviation does not have sufficient combat tactical command and application of its air power has contributed to reduced programs of aerial reconnaissance and air intelligence within its own organization. Likewise, the study of, and development of schools for the study of, the employment of air in support of troops in amphibious operations have been neglected. That fact is particularly illustrated in the nature of tactical air employment questions in promotion examinations.

##### Coordination

Again, if Marine aviation cannot exercise combat tactical command or application, it has no urgent need for a system of coordination with troop units. Consequently, there is not an adequate program of tactical air liaison with Marine ground units. The air officer of a Marine division, only a major in some cases, is utilized as the air representative in the division fire support coordination center. Also at division level, there are two junior aviation officers, called air liaison officers, who man the radio equipment of the division tactical air control party which provides radio communications for the Air Officer at the fire support coordination center. They are required to do very little combat liaison work. At both regiment and battalion there is a forward air controller and his tactical air control party. At battalion, in particular, this is a





**LEFT:** Marine pilot after an emergency landing on freshly-captured Kimpo Airfield. The part played by Marine aviation in close support of ground units in Korea has left little to be desired. As a result, new attention has been focused on tactical air. **RIGHT:** Marine planes not only furnished aerial fire support for the troops on Okinawa, but often dropped food and ammunition to units cut off from normal supply because of mud or the enemy.



vital unit but the forward air controller there is required to act as air liaison officer too. As a result, when he is wanted at the CP, he is found at the OP and when wanted at the OP, can be found at the CP. Tactical liaison from ground to air is sadly lacking and at the time of this writing, there is no tactical ground liaison officer, as such, with the Marine air wing and none even contemplated with the Marine air groups.

### Control

With its Marine air control group, Marine aviation has a well developed organization for controlling and directing air support in the ashore phase of an amphibious operation. However, if a Marine aviator is to be permitted continuity of tactical air support command throughout the entire operation he will need a staff of specialists to coordinate with the Navy's tactical air control squadron in the afloat phase of control. With the speed of aircraft increasing so fast and with night and bad weather control of aircraft becoming increasingly important the radar units of the MACG must be improved considerably to keep up with the times. When support aircraft operate over a wider front, under the control organization, it will be necessary for GCI Squadrons to direct aircraft to specific target areas through the use of radar much as they now do in fighter direction. Radios

At the head of Tactical Air Force, Ryukyus, during early days on Okinawa was MajGen Francis P. Mulcahy, right, discussing plans with BrigGen W. J. Wallace.



must be developed to meet the need of the control system. The AN/VRC-1 radio jeep is outmoded for the work required of it. This is particularly true in the case of the tactical air control party. The MAW, back-packed VHF set will have to be replaced to conform with new methods of communications. The enlisted personnel of the tactical air control party should have special training and a special specification number rather than being only high or low speed operators. They should be able to meet promotion qualifications through training that they receive in the tactical air control party. Radio communications are relied upon extensively in air support control and other means of communications have not been sufficiently developed within Marine aviation to parallel radio.

### METHODS WHICH COULD BE USED TO PERMIT MARINE AVIATION TO EXERCISE COMMAND, APPLICATION, COORDINATION AND CONTROL FOR AIR SUPPORT OF TROOPS THROUGHOUT THE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION

#### Command

A PLACE should be made in the command structure of an amphibious force for a tactical air support commander. This position should be occupied by a senior Marine aviator. The tactical air commander, a senior Naval aviator, would still exercise over-all control of air operations but the tactical air support commander must be permitted to exercise immediate tactical command and application of:

1. General troop support missions (including isolation of enemy units within and immediately threatening the objective area).
2. Close troop support missions.
3. Aerial reconnaissance, including photographic, in the objective area.
4. Air observation.
5. An air intelligence organization.
6. Short range air supply.
7. Short range air evacuation.

8. Courier service for troop units.
9. An air liaison system.
10. The organization for control of the above functions.

The tactical air support commander should be the actual commander of the Marine aviation units being used in the operation. He should be accompanied by the G-2 and G-3 sections of his regular staff. It is not intended that a senior Marine aviator have an air command on a carrier or during purely carrier type operations. While carrier based Marine squadrons are working in the air over the amphibious objective area in accordance with their basic mission, however, they should be under their normal Marine aviation operational command. The tactical air support commander should be aboard the flagship of the commander of the amphibious force and should coordinate closely there with the commander amphibious troops and with the tactical air commander. The tactical air commander should directly control:

1. Air warning.
2. Air defense.
3. Anti-submarine warfare air operations.
4. Air searches.
5. Air patrols.
6. Isolation of enemy units outside of the objective area.
7. Anti-small boat air operations.
8. Search and rescue.
9. Courier service for navy units.
10. Long range reconnaissance.
11. Long range air evacuation.
12. Long range air supply.
13. Central air intelligence.
14. Control organization for the above.

He should permit the tactical air support commander to apply all aircraft operating in support of troop operations. If heavily threatened by enemy air he can draw on troop support fighters for air defense. Likewise, if enemy air is very weak he can assign Navy air units to the tactical air support commander for troop support missions. The tactical air support commander should move ashore and continue to coordinate closely with the commander amphibious troops. When the tactical air command is shifted ashore he should maintain his same status

with the new tactical air commander (a more senior Marine aviator) or he might become the shore-based tactical air commander himself. In either event, he and his G-2 and G-3 Sections must run air support of troops throughout the entire operation, thereby giving continuity to command.



If there is more than one attack force and one amphibious corps in the landing it will be necessary to have subordinate elements for command of troop air support under the tactical air support commander. A tactical air support director, a Marine aviator, should assume this position. He would operate in much a similar manner as illustrated with the tactical air support commander but only in corps area. He would operate in conjunction with the Navy tactical air direction center afloat at attack force level of command until a Marine air control group activated a tactical air direction center ashore.

### Application

In the application of air support it would become necessary to enlarge the aerial reconnaissance and air intelligence functions in Marine aviation. The tactical air support commander must have these means immediately available to him in order to supply timely support to the troops. Photo pilots specially trained in recognizing troop operations and ground targets should provide constant photo coverage—over the front lines—two days operations beyond front lines, and—on required positions deeper in enemy territory. They should be prepared also to take night illumination photos. The final requirement of air support photography is a system of fast delivery to the users of the photographs. All other sources of intelligence information should also be available to aviation so that a thorough intelligence program can be carried out. Aerial photo interpreters are indispensable to the air intelligence system and a thorough training program should be set up for them. Some of the photo interpreters should also be trained as weapon selection experts and be available to evaluate targets for proper type of weapon. The combination of air reconnaissance, aerial photography, photo interpretation, air intelligence and weapon selection should provide information sufficient enough for the tactical air support commander to plan for, and make a detailed application of, every aircraft supplied to him for support work. He should have that combination in his regular G-2 and G-3 staff sections and assigned aircraft.

### Coordination

Coordination should be much more extensive between Marine aviation and Marine ground. The major or lieutenant colonel now acting as air representative in the division fire support coordination center should remain in that position specifically. His duties at division headquarters should be taken over by a colonel in aviation who should be a direct representative of the tactical air support commander. That colonel would be the senior air liaison officer in the division and the air officer in the FSCC should be his immediate assistant. There should be air liaison officers at regiment and battalion also and



all of them would make up the division air liaison section. They should have communications provided to allow them to communicate with each other and with the tactical air control center and direction centers. They should take over the function of making the request for air support now handled by the forward air controller of the tactical air control party. Similarly, there should be a ground liaison section with air units, at least at wing level. There should be a system of getting together the tactical air support commander and the appropriate ground unit commander (in peace time the division commander). They should have regular daily meetings during joint operations room maintained by the tactical air support command and preferably close to the ground unit command post. Briefings should be presented at the daily meetings by G-2 and G-3 of air for the air picture and by G-2 and G-3 of the ground unit for the ground picture. These meetings should take place prior to the issue of the air-ground plans for the next day and should be the basis of those plans.

### Control

Control and direction of troop support must be more detailed and should be continually under the over-all supervision of the tactical air support commander from the arrival of the advance force in the objective area to the end of the consolidation phase. This requirement could be facilitated by attaching a staff of Marine air support specialists to the Navy tactical air control squadron. They could form a tactical air support control section in that squadron similar to the method now used in the Marine air control group. They would control the nets and operations concerning those functions under the command of the tactical air support commander.

Air liaison parties should be created consisting of one aviation officer and the necessary enlisted personnel to handle communications. These parties should be assigned at division regiment and battalion. The tactical air control parties at regiment and division should be eliminated since the need for control at these echelons is small. The tactical air control party and the air liaison party of the assault battalions would be the first air control elements ashore in an amphibious landing. The air liaison party should handle requests for air strikes and the tactical air control party the direction of the aircraft. These two units should have both wire and radio communications with each other. They should both have communications with the tactical air direction center on the TAR and the TAD nets. A high frequency TAD net should be added for close coordination between the tactical air control party and the tactical air direction center. A similar air liaison party and TACP should be attached to tank battalions for controlling the column cover that should be assigned for armored operations. In addition to enlisted men trained in wire and radio-telephone operations these

parties should have enlisted radio technicians attached to each party to correct radio difficulties that have proven so troublesome in past operations.

A Marine air control group will set up a tactical air direction center on the beach as soon as possible in a landing. When its tactical air support control section and the necessary radar elements are sufficiently well set up to take over troop support operations the tactical air support commander should move ashore to coordinate with the appropriate troop commander. The fact that the tactical air support commander remains the same person throughout the operation and that his G-2 and G-3 remains the same thereby gives continuity to control.

The radar units to be used in the control of support aircraft must move ashore as soon as possible. This element will undoubtedly be much more important in future operations. They can, for example, work closely with combat air reconnaissance aircraft deeper in enemy territory directing support aircraft to the correct position whenever the reconnaissance pilots find profitable targets for them.

### Conclusion

History has always played a strong part in war planning by indicating in retrospect the value of a weapon or combat tactic to be used in the future. This article has attempted to show that the history of air support of troops in the last war has indicated definitely that development along certain lines is necessary and vital to a better air support system. An attempt was made to apply that indicated development to the present system so that few changes should be necessary to bring about the desired results. The basic mission of Marine aviation as listed at the beginning of this article is and undoubtedly will continue to be, support of amphibious troops. That there has always been room for improvement, has been clearly indicated by history. That there will always be room for improvement in the future as tactics, techniques and equipment of either air or the other service units change, is a foregone conclusion. There will be changes necessitated by guided missiles, by jet aircraft, by the more widely dispersed units during atomic warfare, by all weather flying, by better anti-aircraft defense systems, by cold weather operations and by many other factors that will occur. However, any changes required can be initiated, developed and brought to successful completion by a program which provides for *command, application, coordination and control* of air support of troops *within* Marine aviation.

USMC






# In Brief

A new altitude record for American-built single stage rockets was set at Army's White Sands Proving Grounds, Las Cruces, New Mexico, recently when a Navy Viking rocket soared upward 107 miles. At the point in its climb when fuel supply of liquid oxygen and ethyl alcohol had been exhausted, the five and one-half ton, 50-foot-long research vehicle was moving at a speed of over one mile per second. The previous record, held by another Viking, was 106 miles after being set off from a ship in mid-Pacific last May. Five tests have been held to date. The final testing calls for 10 such flights in all.

Supersonic airplanes flying 1700 miles per hour are possibilities for the immediate future, by 1960 certainly, according to aircraft engineers who have been making this goal their project. Pencil-thin speedsters with power in excess of six locomotives, driven by turbo-jets are offered as the best bet in achieving this end. The main task at hand is reducing the "drag" to a minimum since there is where the power for flight faces its greatest opposition.

The "World's biggest warplane" is an important part of this country's defense program. The Convair B-36D (below) carries six conventional engines and four jets giving the airship a combined total of more than 40,000 horsepower. The plane is able to maintain speeds in excess of 435 miles per hour at altitudes above 45,000 feet. All B-36 type bombers, including earlier models, are being equipped with these supplementary jet powerplants.



Radar equipped, the Air Force's latest jet fighter, an all-weather Lockheed F-94 (above), was recently flown day and night for a 30-day period to simulate six months' combat flying. Crews worked on a round-the-clock basis as three of these jets were run through rugged tests to see just how much they could take. Succeeding the famed F-80 Shooting Star, this new jet contains an afterburner, consisting of a simple grid in the tail cone which is sprayed fuel for increased power.

President of the Arthritis and Rheumatism Foundation, Judge Robert P. Patterson, one-time Secretary of War, has made an appeal for maximum public support of the two million dollar drive to combat "the nation's most widespread crippler." He stated, "Few realize that arthritis was a major cause for medical evacuation of American soldiers from North Africa during World War II . . . Veterans Administration hospitals recorded 33,878 veterans seeking treatment for arthritis and rheumatism during the year 1949 alone."


Friction, long-time scourge of the mechanical world, has been licked in certain components of guided missiles according to North American Aviation, Inc. They state that they have discovered "the first practical use of air bearings." These bearings, lubricated by a film of air 1,000th of an inch in thickness, have no starting friction. A shaft mounted on air bearings is supposed to turn at the "touch of a feather" and continue turning long after a similar shaft mounted on conventional bearing would have stopped because of the excessive amount of friction that accumulates.

*Rust proof coatings* for many items of material now being used by the Armed Forces has proven an invaluable aid in the protection of this equipment. Announcement has been made by The American Chemical Paint Company that they are now using this process to preserve firearms, cartridge clips, and other essentials easily rusted, especially in the bad weather our troops are now encountering in Korea.

The *new version Walkie-Talkie* will eliminate much of the trouble that World War II models of this communication equipment often encountered. Considerable redesigning has brought about much improvement. About one-half the weight and bulk of the earlier set which weighed 20 pounds and measured 432 cubic inches, this outfit has the added advantage of increased mobility.

*North American F-86D interceptor planes* are due to receive jet engines equipped with automatic electronic controls. These controls will require only that the pilot press the starter button and regulate the throttle for the power he wants. The electronic device will do the remainder of the work for him with more consistency than a human could maintain. The "brains" regulate fuel flow through the engine to bring about optimum performance regardless of conditions.

*Last month In Brief* gave space to the then new recruit marksman record and had to add to it when that record was broken before we went to press. Before the GAZETTE reached subscribers, the record was broken for the third time in a month when Pvt Jack Dedina, 18, of Chicago, Ill. (below), fired 238 out of a possible 250. Dedina is a reserve who was called to duty in late September.



*A demonstration of a short radius turn* through the use of hydroflaps by the Martin XP5M-1 (above) has proven successful. Hydroflaps are underwater rudders and brakes developed by Martin engineers to make possible quick turns and faster maneuvering in restricted waters. The flaps are located on each side of the hull near the stern. They are operated from the cockpit through the hydraulic system and may be used separately or together, when braking action is desired. The hydroflap angle may be set as great as 65 degrees when radius is about one and one-half the wingspan.

*A new crash rescue boat* prototype designed specifically for rescuing airmen down at sea has been perfected for use by the Air Force. The first of these boats is now in the hands of a rescue crew stationed at the Naval Gun Factory, Washington, D. C. The craft is 40 feet long and has a hinged "tailgate" at the stern which can be lowered into the water to provide a working platform for bringing survivors aboard. This "tailgate" can be lowered 18 inches into the water and a litter can be placed under the injured man to slide gently up the ramp into the aft cabin.

*A career improvement program* backed by Navy funds has been opened to active duty Naval personnel who enroll in certain off-duty courses in accredited civilian schools. Three-quarters of tuition costs up to \$7.50 a semester hour will be paid by the Navy under the plan. To be eligible, Naval personnel must be on active duty and be reasonably sure that remaining duty at present stations will allow completion of courses. As many as two courses per semester will be allowed.



# Salvage Is Everybody's Job

*By LtCol Frank Mallen*

☛ THE NECESSITY OF SENDING TROOPS FAR AFIELD TO engage in battle increases the importance of salvage operations. Combat organizations attain greater efficiency by self-sufficiency and there is no safer insurance for this desirable status than the reclamation and redistribution of vital materiel and supplies, particularly so in modern fighting when devastation from the skies and heavy gunfire is carried on with such marked persistence.

Most everybody is salvage-minded in one form or another. But it takes practical, experienced, and well-trained men to accomplish this work to the best interests of the service. Although there is a certain responsibility on the part of every Marine in a combat unit toward salvage, he is usually able to take care of himself and

his buddies in this respect but he has a more vital job, to help reduce and eliminate the enemy. In other words his job is fighting. There must be another Marine coming up whose job is salvage. Not an easy assignment by any means for there may be times when he will have to fight as well as look after salvage. But salvage must be his primary mission. And he must operate under an SOP that will coordinate his efforts with those of others, similarly trained, for the over-all efficiency of the command.

Let's look at the economic factor. Everything used in war today costs more than similar items cost the taxpayers in previous wars, in some instances two and three times as much. Too great a demand from fighting forces for certain supplies creates scarcities and profiteer-



**LEFT: Victim of a land mine during the savage fighting on Okinawa, this tank contains much salvageable material, including the bogeys in mud in foreground.**

ing through gray and black markets back home and uses up man hours that could be put to better advantage. Therefore the recovery and reclamation of materiel for re-use will not only save much money but will lessen the heavy demand from the home front.

Then there is the matter of shipping, a very important factor when troops operate thousands of miles away. No matter how many ships and cargo planes are available, shortages in certain supplies always seem to be the order of the day. Ordnance, food, clothing, PX and hospital necessities, ammunition and even mail, must go forward to combat forces in a never ending stream. These and other essentials, not overlooking more and more men as replacements or in new units, take a lot of ship and plane space. Coordinated and proficient salvage operations in the field could save a tremendous amount of cubic feet in cargo space for something else that might help win the war.

THE TIME ELEMENT must be considered in logistics too. Gear on the way is of no value to combat troops urgently in need of it. It must always be borne in mind that it takes time to get things out to the front and a lot of supply people are working against time at a greatly accelerated pace to move it along. Then again, due to mishap or enemy action, the gear may not get there. Like the inevitable heroes in story and movie plots this is where salvage groups should come in, either with the actual McCoy or through improvisation.

Every unit in the field should have some provision for salvage, and usually does, although actual combat conditions might later render this activity inoperable, or the section might be suddenly switched to some other vital task. Therefore there must be a higher, over-all, echelon ready to take over and carry on. For this reason, as well as a great many others, the higher echelon must be of a mobile nature and it should consist, if at all possible, of a battalion. This size organization would permit the detaching of sections to assist combat units without impairing the efficiency of the salvage program, whether the main body of troops operates on a corps or division level. The trained salvage battalion must have sufficient authority and officers and men to carry out its mission.



**Expeditionary cans left behind on Okinawa are still good but will deteriorate fast if left out in the weather. Salvage is important command responsibility.**

On a corps level the salvage battalion would operate as corps salvage; on a division level as division salvage. This battalion would not supersede organic salvage units but would supplement and coordinate their work and be responsible for replacements in trained men, as well as supplies.

The distinct advantage of a salvage battalion over organic units would lie in its mobility. A mobile salvage battalion would not necessarily be compelled to operate in fixed positions and it would not have to wait for business but would constantly be out looking for it. Any one having served with combat troops abroad where accountability is no longer the order of the day knows that there is plenty of business to be found. He also knows that deterioration moves with the swiftness of a snake to destroy any abandoned or damaged article left on the beach or field. The operations in Guadalcanal and Bougainville point up the necessity for quick salvage action. A tremendous amount of gear could have been reclaimed if specialized troops were on hand to do it.

An all-important and prime function of a salvage battalion would be the operation of laundries as soon after D Day as possible and until established laundry units could come up and take over. There are Pacific veterans who maintain that the best morale booster they could get was a change of clothing, especially scivvies. There are naval doctors who will sign any testimonials telling how clean and sterilized clothes cut down on diseases in the field. And if that isn't argument enough for rushing in portable laundries there is the matter of waste of

**Beaches and battlefields are littered with seemingly worthless equipment. The author presents a plan for salvaging and reclaiming this gear and justifiably points out such action may prevent serious shortage in future operations**

clothing that ran into astronomic figures in the early days of World War II on the Pacific islands.


The largest mobile salvage unit operating in the South Pacific was known as the Reclamation Company, Supply Service, IMAC. This writer was the Commanding Officer. Prior to a pending operation, a conference was held with C-4 of the III Corps, as how best to cope with salvage, following which C-4 drew up and published an order to integrate and coordinate all salvage activity. Because of its simplicity, flexibility, and clarity it is offered here as an outstanding sample order for this phase of operation:

#### PLAN FOR COMBAT SALVAGE OPERATIONS

##### 1. Organization:

The Reclamation Company, SS, IMAC, will be attached to the 5th Field Depot, and will be reinforced by salvage personnel of the 5th Field Depot and personnel and equipment from other salvage units, also attached to the 5th Field Depot. The Commanding Officer, Reclamation Company, is the Corps Salvage Officer.

Bad surf and enemy gunfire contributed to destruction of landing craft at Iwo Jima. These DUKWs have not been hurt yet, but salt water will ruin them.



Men are not the only casualties in combat. Helmets, packs, canteens, cartridge belts, and weapons are often left behind when the wounded are carried away.

##### 2. Responsibility:

Corps Salvage Officer will be responsible for the execution of Corps salvage operations. Subordinate units are responsible for salvage within their areas, and will take steps to initiate vigorous salvage operations at the earliest practicable date after the initial landing. Corps Salvage Units will cooperate with the salvage section of subordinate units to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of its mission.

##### 3. Functioning:

a) Salvage operation will be initiated by the Corps Salvage Unit in the vicinity of the landing beaches as early as practicable. It will be confined initially to the collection of scattered material, and to the removal of equipment scattered on the beaches, which is subject to destruction due to tide action or beach traffic. This salvage material will be removed to dumps consolidated and processed as soon as beach activity permits.

b) Salvage operations will be extended inland from the beaches as rapidly as the tactical situation will permit. Duplication of effort by the Corps Unit and other subordinate units will be avoided insofar as possible. Corps Salvage Unit will receive material from the lower echelons, which cannot be reclaimed or processed by the means available to those echelons. Material, which cannot be made serviceable in the Combat Area, will be returned to appropriate agencies in the Forward Area for disposition or reclamation. If conditions warrant, elements of the Corps Salvage Unit may be attached to the salvage units of the lower echelons in order to accomplish salvage operation by uniting their capabilities.

##### 4. Salvage Priority:

a) When it becomes necessary to concentrate salvage efforts on individual categories, those items are subject to the greatest deterioration or loss will be salvaged first.

b) Salvage of Landing Craft will be primarily the responsibility of the Salvage Section of the Naval Base. Corps Salvage Units will render assistance to that unit as may be necessary to assist in the salvage of wrecked or beached landing craft.

USMC



## Recent Korea Awards

*The following list of Marines who have received awards in Korea was furnished by Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps.*

### Distinguished-Service Cross:

Cpl Melvin James, Sgt Jack E. Macy, and Cpl Donald D. Sowl

### Legion of Merit:

LtCol Edward R. Hagenah

### Silver Star:

Cpl Alfred J. Abbott, PFC William L. Ames, Capt Victor A. Armstrong, Cpl Victor P. Beauchamp, Capt Richard L. Bland, TSgt Mose W. Boyd, PFC Thomas M. Burke, Cpl William T. Davis, Cpl Robert D. Deeds, PFC John F. Dunne, PFC George W. Graham, Sgt James E. Guffey, Cpl Robert W. Ingram, PFC Frank J. Iorio, PFC Robert C. Jenkins, Cpl John A. Kaczmarek, Sgt Nicolai A. Laudate, Cpl Andrew H. McClain, Capt Robert A. McMullen, Sgt Jack E. Macy, 2ndLt Charles H. Mattox, 1stLt Charles A. Merrill, Cpl Eugene R. Michalski, MSgt Lewis J. Michelony, Jr., Cpl Ray Miller, TSgt Roy J. Mock, Cpl Oscar L. Moore, LtCol George R. Newton, PFC Robert F. Perkins, Pvt Gordon L. Phillips, PFC Vito A. A. Polletta, PFC Howard J. Reed, PFC Ardis Romero, Jr., Pvt David A. Schrum, Sgt Virgil R. Shaw, Cpl Jack Sindlinger, TSgt Howard W. Solheim, TSgt Dale L. Stropes, 2ndLt Warren H. Taylor, 1stLt Chester E. Tucker, Sgt Richard L. Van Nice, and PFC Carl G. Volker, Jr.

### Bronze Star:

PFC Harold E. Aubrey, PFC Charles N. Ayers, 1stLt George A. Babe, PFC Donald W. Baird, TSgt Robert W. Barnett, PFC John N. Basaites, Maj William L. Batchelor, Maj William L. Bates, Jr., 1stLt George S. Belli, Sgt William N. Bergeria, Cpl Vincent L. Boylan, Maj David W. Bridges, Maj Charles H. Brush, PFC Donald F. Burch, PFC Burnett H. Cain, Jr., 1stLt Francis B. Carlon, 1stLt Johnny L. Carter, 1stLt George G. Chambers, Jr., Cpl John C. Childs, PFC Stanley R. Christianson, Capt John F. Coffey, 2ndLt Harold L. Coffman, Capt Thomas E. Cooney, Sgt Maurice Cordova, Cpl Owen E. Crockett, Capt Welby W. Cronk, SSgt James J. Cross, Maj James N. Cupp, Cpl Robert E. Custance, Sgt John Darakjian, 1stLt Eugene C. Davis, Jr., PFC Louis G. Delgado, PFC Bartholomew N. DeMaio, SSgt Frank A. D'Errico, PFC Peter M. Donaho, Cpl Okey J. Douglas, Sgt Melvin V. Eggersgluss, 2ndLt Clyde L. Eyer, 1stLt Joseph R. Fisher, MSgt Lawrence C. Fries, PFC Byron Furginson, Jr., 2ndLt Philip J. Garm, Maj Vincent J. Gottschalk, Sgt Glenn F. Gregg, MSgt Guiseppe Guilano, Jr., LtCol Edward R. Hagenah, PFC Hugo Hammond, Cpl Jack R. Harrison.

Cpl Ray W. Hart, PFC John V. Hewitt, Sgt James F. Huthner, PFC Robert J. Johnson, Sgt Walter P. Joseph, Jr., 1stLt Edward E. Kaufer, 2ndLt Robert R. Kiernan, PFC Marion L. Kite, TSgt Lester R. Klock, Sgt James D. Knauss, 1stLt William F. Koehlein, PFC Ralph J. Kwiecinski, PFC Norman F. LaBounty, SSgt Edwin T. LaChance Jr., 1stLt Fred Lawton, Jr., SSgt Stanley G. Leary, 1stLt Jack M. Lerond, PFC Albert

K. Luminais, SSgt Thomas A. McAnally, Jr., Capt Thomas E. McCarthy, Capt James F. McInteer, Jr., PFC Harry S. Martin, Jr., Sgt Richard L. Martson, 2ndLt William J. Masterpool, SSgt William F. Melville, Cpl Leo J. Moody, Cpl Ruben L. Moreno, SSgt Leonard F. Meyers, Jr., Maj Reginald R. Meyers, Pvt Oliver O'Neill, Jr., 1stLt Edward L. F. Proffitt, Sgt Richard E. Raschke, LtCol Robert W. Rickert, MSgt Andrew J. Robinson, PFC Harry E. Rosenbrough, SSgt Albert J. Salonis, PFC Joseph S. Salvage, Cpl Earl R. Seifert, Sgt William C. Shadley, Maj Donald W. Sherman, PFC Raymond T. Smith, 2ndLt Edward W. Snelling, 1stLt Charles R. Stephenson, III, Maj Frank R. Stewart, Jr., PFC James H. Stewart, Maj John R. Stone, 1stLt Jay J. Thomas, Cpl Marrell E. Tracey, PFC Robert D. Van Note, LtCol Ellsworth G. Van Orman, 1stLt Norman Vining, Jr., 1stLt Paul A. Vnencak, 1stLt Otis R. Waldrop, Cpl Lewis H. Walker, PFC Charles Wasilkowski, Capt George C. Westover, 1stLt Jack D. White, PFC Hubert L. Wilkinson, Cpl Albert R. Williams, 1stLt Harold B. Wilson, SSgt James L. Wilson, Jr., 2ndLt Lyle H. Worster, Capt Robert P. Wray, 1stLt Robert E. Young, and PFC Karl M. Zogg.


### Commendation Ribbon:

Capt Victor A. Armstrong, 1stLt Arthur R. Bancroft, TSgt Lloyd B. Britt, Sgt Victor G. Chambers, 2ndLt Harold L. Coffman, TSgt Frank V. Cutting, 1stLt Harold J. Davis, Cpl Gordon D. DeBeauchamp, PFC Edward F. Gallagher, PFC John A. Gore, Maj Vincent J. Gottschalk, 1stLt James D. Grounds, Cpl Carl A. Josenhans, Cpl John C. Kempf, 1stLt Winslow E. Lewis, 1stLt Gustave F. Lueddeke, PFC Alan E. Martin, Capt Alfred F. McCaleb, SSgt John A. Ormand, 2ndLt Eugene J. Paradis, Capt William C. Parker, Jr., SSgt Earl E. Payne, 2ndLt Clifford J. Peabody, 2ndLt Patrick G. Sivert, SSgt Walter Smithart, 1stLt Joris J. Snyder, Sgt John N. Stent, MSgt Herbert J. Valentine, 1stLt Ewald A. Vom Orde, Jr., and PFC Columbus J. Wall.

### Letter of Commendation:

2ndLt George Caridakis, 1stLt Kenneth O. Cook, Capt Thomas E. Cooney, 1stLt Lloyd R. Day, 2ndLt Paul E. Denny, 1stLt John J. Deppe, 2ndLt Francis X. Donovan, 1stLt George R. Ernest, Capt William A. Earney, 1stLt Harold J. Fitzgeorge, 1stLt William C. Foote, 2ndLt Clarence W. Friesen, 1stLt Anthony J. Galaziewski, 2ndLt Joseph M. Glasgow, Capt Eric R. Haars, 1stLt Howard H. Harris, 1stLt Robert E. Hill, 2ndLt John M. Jackson, 1stLt William E. Johnson, 1stLt Lance T. McBee, 1stLt Clarence E. McGuinness, 1stLt Joseph F. McPartland, 2ndLt Arthur R. Mooney, 2ndLt Joseph Mordente, Maj Warren Morris, 2ndLt Richard C. Morrow, 2ndLt Minard P. Newton, 1stLt Austin S. Parker, 2ndLt Robert D. Reem, Maj Maurice E. Roach, 2ndLt Victor A. Salvo, Jr., Capt Richard H. Sengewald, 2ndLt Stanley J. Seward, Capt Nicholas L. Shields, 1stLt Earnest H. Stone, Jr., 1stLt Alfred I. Thomas, 2ndLt Roy R. Van Cleve, 2ndLt John W. Werkowski, Jr., Capt Harry D. Wortman, and Maj Henry J. Woessner, III.





# OKINAWA: VICTORY AT THE THRESHOLD

## PART II

By Hanson W. Baldwin

THE FLEET HAS COME TO STAY; THE TRAFFIC ACROSS the Pacific is two-way. The cripples steam home for repairs; replacements of flesh and steel move steadily westward; destroyer divisions from the Central Pacific, the North Pacific, and the Atlantic are ordered to Okinawa to take up their stations in the battered picket line; the great battleship *Iowa* and the cruiser *New Orleans*, returning from overhaul, report for duty at Ulithi; the new carrier *Shangri La* steams westward for her first action. By the end of April—after more heavy attacks on the 22nd, 27th, and 28th—the fleet is bloody but unbowed.

Behind it—part of its great tradition—are incredible episodes of valor; long now will live the tale of *USS Laffey*, a ship with the luck of her Irish name, attacked in the closing days of April by 22 Kamikazes, claiming nine of them as victims of her guns, crashed by eight in a “Val and Judy nightmare,” still able to creep into Kerama Rhetto at four knots.

Gone now—afloat and ashore—are the hopes of a quick victory; the Shuri line is still intact; the “bong,

bong, bong” of General Quarters still sounds by day and by night. The fleet settles down for a long trial by blood and fire; Task Force 58, with five of its original eleven CVs, and 14 of its original 65 destroyers en route to, or in port, for repairs, prepares a rotational and replacement program. By the end of April, 20 U. S. ships have been sunk, 14 of them by suiciders, one by conventional air attack and 157 damaged, 90 of them by the Kamikaze special attack corps, and 47 others by aerial bombs or torpedoes.

In retrospect, it can be seen that April was decisive in the greatest battle of ships against planes in history.



## Carrier planes against land-based planes . . . ships against determined suicide bombers. Never before had the U. S. Navy lost so much in so little time. Despite heavy losses in men and vessels the Fleet stayed to accomplish its mission

With April's end the "Kikusui" (Special Attack) operations did not falter; the terrible battle was to drag on for almost two more months, and the ships—tied to the land, vital to the supply, replenishment and support of the ground forces—stood back and forth off the reef-bound coast, and endured. Day after day the long roll


of dead and dying lengthened; day after day the battered ships limped home; day after day more of the "small boys"—tangled masses of blackened steel—sank and were stricken from the Navy list. On May 3, in "50 minutes of hell" the *Aaron Ward* on Picket Station Ten was entered in the rolls of glory; struck by five Kamikazes, her crew fought the "impossible" battle to save their ship—and succeeded. On May 4, the LSM (R) 190 on Picket Station Twelve, fought her way into history; she and the destroyer *Luce* died near in time and space, but she was fought to the end. A radioman, third class, conned her, and her youthful skipper, wounded in the first few minutes of action "lay on his back in the conn, and though unconscious from time to time, nevertheless roused himself to approve or direct the handling of the ship by his juniors." So—day after day, and night after night, unremitting, continuous, there was the brief and flaring action, the slow agony or sudden death.

"We have fed our sea for a thousand years,

And she calls us still unfed."

But never again were the ship losses and damages so

threatening as in that terrible month of April; the defensive-offensive measures lessened the effectiveness of the Kamikazes. Never again were the Kamikazes—their bases under constant attack—to equal the strength of the first great raid in early April. More air strips and radar warning stations were established ashore, though the fleet's own ship-based planes and guns continued to bear the brunt of the defense. Smoke screens veiled the transport area each night; those ships that could be spared made night retirements away from the land, and returned to the beaches at dawn. The strength of the radar picket line was steadily increased. The Kamikaze men-



UPPER LEFT: A suicide plane comes diving in for the kill on shipping off Okinawa, its motor streaming smoke from a hit. ABOVE: This Japanese plane began disintegrating before it hit the water. Note wing tip in air. LEFT: Antiaircraft bursts dot the sky as an enemy plane is exploded just beyond the *ESSEX* in action off Okinawa. Undeterred, the Japanese pilots continued to strike at our shipping despite almost certain death that awaited them. Our losses in men and ships rose steadily during the 82-day campaign.



ace was by no means met, Vice Adm "Bill" Lee was sent back to the states in the midst of the campaign to supervise the development of new weapons, tactics and techniques to meet the "suiciders." But in May and June Okinawa became less and less a struggle of planes against ships, of bombs against steel, and more and more a clash of human wills and a test of human endurance, a struggle of iron men, a battle of men who would live against men who would die. . . .

☛ DAY AFTER DAY AND NIGHT AFTER NIGHT, there were alerts unending; for more than 40 continuous days—until foul weather brought a brief but blessed break—there were air raids every night and every day. Sleep became a long-forgotten thing; yearned for, dreamed about; heads drooped over gunsights; nerves frazzled, tempers snapped; skippers were red-eyed and haggard. Tension was palpable, tangible; never before had the Navy experienced so many cases of combat fatigue. "Magic"—the Navy's system of breaking the enemy's codes and divining his intentions—had enabled the fleet to forecast the days of big attacks (in May, they came on the third and fourth; the tenth and eleventh; the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth, and the twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth). Word had been passed around the Fleet when such mass suicide assaults were anticipated, and loud speakers on various ships had warned the crews to be prepared—sometimes the night before. The practice had to be stopped. The strain of waiting, with the certain knowledge that tomorrow, the men who sought to die would come again and the terror of imagination, vivid from past experience of horror, sent many men into hysteria, insanity, breakdown.

That saving American trait—a sense of humor—kept some from the brink of horror. On one picket station a tiny gunboat, its crew fed up with constant attacks, near misses, suiciders and close brushes with death, rigged up a huge sign with a pointing arrow: "To Jap pilot—This Way to Task Force 58."


There was no surcease from fear, monotony, and exhaustion. The alarm gong, with its deliberate "bong, bong, bong," and the tense voice of the boatswain's mate—"General Quarters, General Quarters—All hands man your battle stations"—came to have a diabolic tone, a sense of doom; it left a cold, dull lump of terror, heavy like a growth, in the pit of the stomach. Nights were

worse. You could hear them coming then, long before the eye could see them—the far drone of the engine, and the thin scream rising to a wail, a roar and a crescendo, the whole bowl of the night sky visible with the noise of the death-dive. The 20s and the 40s would finger toward them, and suddenly the Kamikaze would flame and burn and burst into a moving, flaring torch, and this monstrous death, screaming as it came, would be roaring down upon you—as you stood, punily protected by helmet, flash-proof clothing, face mask, gloves, and lifejacket.

The dread of anticipated horror, and the few fleeting seconds of action—oft repeated—when the heart stood still were, perhaps, no worse in a different way than the dull weight of fatigue and grimy living and ordered monotony that settled like a pall over the fleet. Aboard the carrier *Randolph*, in Task Force 58, 100 miles to the East, the general mess served spam sandwiches for 57 consecutive days. The heavy battle gear—helmets, life jackets, flash-proof clothing—in a humid, hot climate wore upon body and mind; moments of rest were not much better.

☛ "AFTER A COUPLE OF MONTHS OF ACTION," recorded Lt Stuart D. Cowan, Jr., USNR, "you can guess pretty well what kind of a night it will be. Sometimes you take off only your shoes and flop down in dirty, sweaty khakis. If it looks quiet, you sleep in your shorts—nobody ever wears pajamas. The searing heat makes you break out with heat rash all over your body and sweat soaks the sheets. . . . The pounding of the main battery on a tin can (destroyer) makes living extremely uncomfortable. Fiber glass particles, from the insulation material, sift down like fine snow and fill your bunk—you feel as if you'd been sleeping on needles—and your arms and legs break out with red splotches. The damn stuff gets in your clothes, hair and eyes. Cork and dirt are blown out of the ventilating system into your food, dishes are smashed, pipes break, rivets pop out; fixtures dangle drunkenly, and the ship shudders from stem to stern each time the guns fire."

Skippers took all sorts of measures to keep up morale; the dull weight of weariness their enemy. The destroyer *Lowry* installed record players in the wardroom and plotting room and connected them to the ship's loud-speaker system; music, special newscasts, and radio pro-





grams were broadcast from reveille to dusk. There was ice cream three times a week; mimeographed communiques to mail home, and a daily ship's paper — "The Bucket and Swab."

Alert — General Quarters — Condition Two — General Quarters — Alert, the crew always at the guns, the alarm gong clanging, the TBS radio blating, "Flash Red, Flash Red!" and:

"Hello Big Boy. This is Haywire. Have two Vals under fire. Splash One! Splash Two! . . ."

"Tallyho four Zekes — Two o'clock low. Angels four — Let's go! . . ."

Day after day, night after night, hour after hour. . .

Ashore, the bloody, slogging progress inches into the Shuri Line, but the Japs' defenses are still intact, and on 22 May, the commanding general of the III Amphibious Corps reports that the Marines are encountering the most effective artillery fire yet encountered in the Pacific. The "plum rains" of Okinawa come in a deluge in late May; fields become swamps, tanks are mired, mud is king; ammunition and fuel is moved to the front in amphibious vehicles. From 22 to 29 May, the enemy line holds "with hardly a dent against every attack."

Back in the rear areas, the gyrenes, huddled in the dripping tents, raise their cans of beer, and let forth with the famous MacArthur parodies:

"Now the greatest of generals is Douglas, the proud,  
Writer of fine flowing prose  
He paces the floor as his orders ring out  
Down through his aquiline nose. . .

With the help of God  
And a few Marines  
MacArthur retook the Philippines. . ."

Afloat, as ashore, the "no-quarter" fight goes on. Enemy submarines, midget submarines, and suicide boats join the Kamikaze planes in harassment of the fleet. Submarine contacts are reported on May 18, 20, 22, 24,



Aft deck and elevator of the BUNKER HILL after Japanese planes had hit her. Ashes, burned engines, and warped propellers mark the places of planes ready on deck for take-off at the time of attack. Fire control parties saved planes in rear.

25, 26, 27, and 28, but some of them are false; the sonar gear detects a school of fish or a "knuckle" in the current; the sailors dub the contact the "underwater ghost of the Ryukyus." In one suicide boat attack the Japs used everything "from a 30 foot raised deck cruiser to an open dugout canoe with paddlers."

On May 24th-25th one of the heaviest suicide raids since early April strikes the area. The high speed transport *Bates* is sunk, an LSM is abandoned—wrecked, and the "small boys" again take heavy damage. The Japs try a new twist. They bomb the American airstrips ashore at Yontan and Kadena, and then follow up with an airborne landing. Five bombers try to make it; four are shot down in the air; the fifth makes a wheels-up belly landing on a Yontan runway and 10 or 11 Japs jump out and commence to shoot up the neighborhood. Before their riddled bodies line the strip they have destroyed seven American planes, damaged 26 others, ignited 70,000 gallons of gasoline and in general raised "pluperfect hell." In the darkness and the melee wild-

shooting Americans kill and wound some of their own people.

The raids are heavy until noon of the twenty-fifth; the sky is murky and the rain falls in Wagnerian violence. . . .

But on the 26th, the fleet's still there—the gunnery support ships lying offshore pumping their shells into the battered Jap defenses with monotonous regularity, the planes of the tactical air force bombing strafing the Jap that sticks his head out of a cave.

From CG 1st Mar Div to Tac Air Force:

"Our congratulations and thanks for prompt response this afternoon when Nips were caught on road with kimonos down. . . ."

The suicides came again in swarms and coveys on the 27th, and 115 enemy planes are "splashed" that day. In the log of the LCS 123, in Radar Picket Station Five off Southern Okinawa, is recorded—as flashes on a movie screen—the individual drama which is an epitome of the vaster tragedy:

0730—General Quarters

0747—Val dead ahead, closing.

0749—Commenced firing; plane hit, turns toward DD 515 (USS *Anthony*)

0750—Plane splashed

0750—DD 630 (USS *Braine*) hit by Jap suicider. Pilot house burst into flames, enveloping DD in smoke.

0752—Man overboard.

0754—Picked up man overboard.

0757—Proceeding flank speed for DD 630

0802—Commenced picking up survivors and rendering emergency medical aid. Ltjg K. P. Bachman, Medical Corps, treats the casualties and records with medical fidelity the nature of their injuries: "Patient with second degree burns of the hands and face—compound fracture lower right tibia and fibula with extensive soft tissue damage—two inch shrapnel wounds of the left hip and. . . ."

0805—Eight men from our ship jumped into water to aid survivors and furnish lifejackets.



0830—DD 630 aflame and out of control crossed 10 yards in front of our bow. At time our engines backing emergency full.

0930—Secured from taking on survivors.

0934—Moored alongside LCS (L) (3) 13 and took their survivors aboard.

0945—Survivors from LCS (L) (3) 13 aboard. Underway for DD 630 to assist in putting out fires.

0957—Moored alongside DD 630; despatched boarding party.

1037—Secured boarding party for DD 630. Underway for. . . ."

At twelve noon of the 27th, LCS 123 resumed her radar picket patrol in Station No 5 off Okinawa, and her log recorded the end of an episode (end, too, of men's lives):

"Weather gray and cloudy with intermittent drizzle. Sea calm, visibility five miles. 344 rounds of 40 mm; 630 rounds of 20 mm expended. One plane shot down."

But by midnight of the 27th, the destroyer *Brexlor* has gone to join the company of her peers fathoms deep in the East China Sea, and a long list of ships with tilting names—*Gayety*, *Anthony*, and *Braine*, *Sandoval* and *Forrest*, *Gilligan* and *Loy*, the *Mary Livermore*, and the *Brown Victory*—are hurt and limping . . . down by the head, blackened by fire, listing to starboard, freeboard reduced . . . their steel flesh torn and gouged and ruptured, their men groaning in agony, or silent in canvas shrouds. . . .

At midnight of the 27th Adm Raymond H. Spruance, who had led the greatest struggle—sea, land, and air—that Americans have ever fought, and "Pete" Mitscher, who had handled Task Force 58, turned over command to "Wild Bill" Halsey, he of the rakish air, and Sidney John McCain, the tobacco-chewing admiral.

THE WAR DIARY for this period of the Third Fleet—Halsey commanding—notes with an attempt at levity that Halsey and his chief of staff had been in the States on leave "maintaining antiaircraft proficiency, using wild turkeys and quail as targets." The levity—at first—seemed well taken; the last days of May and the first two days of June were light; the Commander of the Fifth Amphibious Force noted on May 30 "for the first time no enemy planes were detected in the area for the 24 hours period." And ashore, the two months battle to breach the Shuri Line was ending; the blood of 26,000 American soldiers and Marines—killed, wounded or missing, the heaviest casualties of the Pacific war—was the price of incomplete victory. But by the end of May, the flower of the 32nd Japanese Army—50,000 men—"the only . . . kind of Japanese casualty—the dead"—lay in the rubble and shell-pocked debris of the strongest fortified position Americans have ever breached, and LtGen Mitsuru Ushijima withdrew his remaining troops for a last "back-to-the-sea" stand in the south. The flag flew above the site of Shuri Castle—built by an ancient, long-forgotten king; the strongpoint of the Jap line for two long months—and out of the rubble of its 20-foot thick walls Marines dug two ancient bells, scarred



and dented by shell fire, inscribed with Chinese characters:

"... and how will the bell sound? It will echo far and wide like a peal of thunder, but with utmost purity. And evil men, hearing the bell, will be saved."

And round about in the pock-marked craters where men had lived, "hung the unforgettable stench of rotting human flesh."

But the end was not yet; the Jap fought to the death; the war diary of the Third Fleet was soon noting "alarming losses of ships on the radar picket stations."

Ashore, the weary, destitute survivors of the 32nd Imperial Army—faithful unto death—stood and died along a rocky line of hills and bluffs from Itoman to Hanagusuku. On 3 June, the Kamikazes came again in 18 raids by 75 planes, and on 4 June nature joined the malevolent forces of the enemy. A typhoon, with gigantic waves, tossed the invasion fleet like chips upon rapids; sheared off the bow of the cruiser *Pittsburgh*, and damaged the carrier *Hornet* and eight other ships. On 5 June, the *Mississippi* and *Louisville* were struck by suiciders; on 6 June there were heavy raids from the north—the enemy was dying hard.

The *Randolph*, carrier, was heavily hurt by one of our own P-38s which crashed while making practice dives on the ship; Japs damaged two other vessels, and groundings, collisions and accidents eight others. On 9 June the *Porter*, destroyer sank "full fathom deep" and on the 16th another "tin can," the *Twiggs*, died from torpedo and Kamikaze and took with her the faithful of her crew. But for three consecutive days there were no raids, and on June 17, in a cave in the



The Kamikaze Corps pilots were not too discriminating in their choice of targets. In this case it was the ENTERPRISE, but they also hit ships as small as LSTs.

Fourth Marine zone in the Oroku peninsula, Adm Minoru Ota, Commander of the Naval Base Force, Okinawa, "was found with his throat cut in a ceremonial pose."

The hard fight was nearly won. . . . But there were many who were never to savor the triumph, for them



only the crosses, row on row, the thin high note of "Taps" over the East China Sea. Ashore, the principal commanders on both sides were among the dead. Simon Bolivar Buckner, Lieutenant-General, United States Army—he of the rolling name, the rugged frame, distinguished heritage, Bolivar Buckner commanding the Tenth American Army, died with the salt of victory so near his lips. On 18 June a Japanese shell burst above a Marine observation post, and "a fragment of coral, broken off by the explosion, struck Gen Buckner in the chest. He collapsed immediately and died 10 minutes later. . . ."<sup>5</sup>

Just three days later—June 21—Gen Ushijima, commander of the disorganized, destitute remnants of his Imperial Majesty's 32nd Japanese Army, and his chief of staff, LtGen Isamu Cho, made ready for death—ceremonial death by hara-kiri—in a cave in what Americans will always know as Hill 89.

"Their cook prepared an especially large meal to be served shortly before midnight. When the meal was finished, the two generals and their staff drank numerous farewell toasts with the remaining bottles of Scotch whiskey which had been carried from Shuri. . . ."

"Alas! The Stars of the Generals have fallen with the setting of the waning moon over Mabuni. . . ."<sup>6</sup>

That same June day, the world was told that organized resistance had ceased on Okinawa, and the next morning, as the band played the Star Spangled Banner, the color guard "raised the American flag" over a blood-drenched island, and a "sudden breeze swept the flag out full against a blue and quiet sky."

But it was to end as it began—this greatest of all

battles—savagery and sudden chilling death from the sky. The night of 21 June, a small group of enemy planes, "showing the proper IFF (radar identification, friend, or foe) code, attacked" the anchorage at Kerama Rhetto; the aircraft tender *Curtiss* was seriously damaged; two "small boys" were sunk. And on the 22nd, as if in defiance of the star-spangled flag that flew at last over Okinawa, 30 raids—some of them by Jap pilots "highly skilled and aggressive"—bore down upon the fleet, as the remnants of the 32nd Army went to self-immolation ashore in fanatic banzai charges or suicides. The sky fights were frantic and lethal; that day, 2ndLt F. B. Smith, and 2ndLt Roger D. Allcroft, U. S. Marine Corps, flying a combat air patrol, tangled with many Japs and gave their lives for the common cause. Lt Allcroft was last seen "riding down on the tail of a smoking Zeke with all guns firing"; a short time later, members of a low patrol heard his last words over the radio:

"Come on up here. I have got a Tojo and two Zekes cornered!"

Smith's epitaph, too, was recorded by the TBS in the crackling jargon—laden with static—that poured out over the loud speakers of the combat information centers of the surface ships:

"For God's sake, help me. There are a million of them. There are three or four on my tail. . . . Splash One . . . and I am shot all to hell and heading back for base. . . ."

(Three minutes later, weakly) ". . . This is Smitty—oil pressure zero . . . temperature . . . going to. . ."

The battle for Okinawa can be described only in the grim superlatives of war. Churchill correctly characterized it as among "the most intense and famous of military history." In size, scope and ferocity it dwarfed

<sup>5</sup>"Okinawa—The Last Battle."

<sup>6</sup>"Okinawa, The Last Battle."



the Battle of Britain. Never before had there been, probably never again will there be, such a vicious sprawling struggle of planes against planes, of ships against planes. Never before, in so short a space, had the Navy lost so many; never before in land fighting had so much American blood been shed in so short a time, in so small an area, probably never before in any three months of war had the enemy suffered so hugely.

It was a no-quarter struggle, fought on, under, and over the sea and land, and the lethal statistics of combat proved "the last battle" an expensive but overwhelming victory for U. S. arms. More than 110,000 Japanese died, 12,281 Americans were killed; more than 36,000 wounded. The Navy's dead numbered almost 5,000, more than either the Army or the Marines. The Japanese lost 16 combat ships, including the great *Yamato* (in addition to thousands of tons of commercial shipping sunk by patrol planes operating from Kerama Rhetto).

THE NAVY LOST 36 SHIPS, WITH 368 DAMAGED (including damages due to storm, collision and grounding) and of this number 26 were sunk and 164 damaged by Kamikazes, and two were sunk and 61 damaged by conventional air attacks. But 7,830 Jap planes were destroyed in three months. About 3,047 enemy aircraft were shot down by Navy and Marine planes; the Fleet's guns accounted for 409 or more; 2,655 were lost in operational accidents; hundreds were destroyed on the ground; 558 were credited to the Twentieth Air Force and hundreds were deliberately wrecked in the suicide crashes of the men who wished to die.

Our losses, including those of the big Air Force bombers who smashed at Japanese fields, were 736 planes, and only 458 of these were lost to enemy anti-

aircraft or in aerial combats; the rest were operational losses. Nothing larger than a destroyer was lost to the enemy; of the larger ships damaged, all except one—an escort carrier—were repaired—most of them quickly; the Japanese did not sink a single American carrier, battleship, cruiser or transport.

The "fleet that came to stay," stayed and endured, fought and lived, worked and cruised close to the enemy's land-based air power, made the land conquest possible, and gave far more than it received. Upon the battle of the ships versus planes hinged the whole campaign of Okinawa. The simple accolade of understatement so well applied to the brave men of the little ships— . . . . "they stuck it out with demonstrated valor," is equally applicable to all those of Okinawa—dead and living—who stood, fought and endured in the greatest battle of U. S. arms. But to the "small boys," the "spitkids," the "tin cans"—the little ships of the radar picket line—belongs a special glory; they bore the overwhelming share of death and destruction; they were the thin and blood-stained line that stood between the sons of Heaven and the dominion of the East China Sea. USMC

The sources used in the preparation of this article were chiefly the after action reports and war diaries of participating units, especially various ships and commands of the Third and Fifth Fleets. Other works consulted, and/or quoted, include:

"U. S. Army in World War II—The War in the Pacific—Okinawa, The Last Battle" by Appleman, Burns, Gugeler, and Stevens, Historical Division, Department of the Army, U. S. Government Printing Office.

*The Campaigns of the Pacific War, and Interrogations of Japanese Officials, Vols. I and II*—United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific) Naval Analysis Division.

*The Marines' War* by Fletcher Pratt; Wm. Sloan Associates. *Parliamentary Debates, (Hansard), Volume 437, No. 104, Wednesday 14, May, 1947.*





# How Would You Do It?

By LtCol W. F. Prickett

IN THE SUMMER OF 1942, AN AIRPLANE FACTORY IN Mukden, Manchuria, reached capacity production and still could not meet the quota assigned by the war lords in Tokyo. The plant was situated in downtown Mukden and had no room for expansion. A new factory was built on the outskirts of town and new machinery ordered. In typical Japanese fashion, the last thing to be done was the laying of the concrete deck—the ground was not even leveled before the buildings were up.

Along with the lack of space in Mukden, there was a corresponding lack of machinists, electricians, and mechanics to work in the new factory. Therefore orders were sent to the Philippines to canvass all the prisoners of war and send qualified technicians to Mukden. Responses to the questionnaires the POWs were required to fill out indicated that none of them could do anything mechanical or electrical. However, they had all given their correct names, ranks (rates), organizations and serial numbers. The U. S. Navy enlisted ratings revealed the specialties and the U. S. Army organizations revealed their qualifications in many cases. This information which the Japanese already possessed enabled them to select 1,000 men, put them aboard ship, and send them to Mukden. In the majority of cases, the men selected

and groups at their jobs. There was not, however, constant supervision of personnel at their work.

Realizing that they had to work or die, the POWs chose to work. They tried slow-down methods and were assigned definite quotas in square feet of concrete to be poured daily. They tried mixing the concrete improperly so that it couldn't be leveled or it cracked. The same old beatings and reduction of rations greeted each of these attempts to hinder production. The doctors who had accompanied the men tried excusing the men because of illness and were told that only 10 per cent could be sick at any one time. Many a man went to work with a temperature of 103 degrees and even higher. Finally, Japanese doctors examined all those excused by the Americans in order to get more workers.

*Under similar circumstances what would you have done?*

Here is what those POWs did. They made a study of all the machines and tools. Small parts which were vital to the operation of the machinery and could not be replaced from local stocks or manufactured locally were selected. Great care was taken that no part was chosen that could be replaced by altering a similar part from another machine. Only parts whose absence would not be noticed until an attempt was made to run the machine were selected. When the concrete was ready for pouring, the same part from each machine was thrown on the ground and covered with concrete. Large holes in the uneven ground were filled with complete machines—lathes,




were well qualified electricians, mechanics, and machinists.


While the POWs were enroute to Manchuria, the downtown plant was dismantled and all its machinery plus newly-purchased machines were stored on the dirt floor inside the recently completed buildings at the factory's suburban site.

On arrival, the POWs were ordered to lay a concrete deck in the buildings. They were informed that the plant they were to work in was an airplane factory and that they had been chosen for the detail because of their specialized knowledge. Refusals to work would result in beatings and reduction of the already slim rations.

The factory consisted of a group of buildings with a fence around them. Guards were posted at all the gates and supervisors made continual checks of individuals







"Made in U. S. A." label). However, it was thought that the factory could be converted to manufacture presses for stamping out sections of the fuselage of airplanes. Plans were made to implement this changeover.

Conversion was completed by early summer, 1943. The workers were assigned their individual jobs and blueprints issued for the manufacture and assembly of the presses. The factory was all set to aid Japan's war potential again. Each set of blueprints had at least one penciled correction.

#### *Now what would you have done?*

Here is those men's solution. First they traced the corrections made on each set of blueprints. Everyone in the camp submitted in his own handwriting a copy of each set of corrections. The tracings were compared with the copies submitted and the man whose writing most nearly resembled that on the tracing was given the tracing and spent a day or two attempting to duplicate this writing. In the meantime, a thorough study was made of the plans in order to determine where one change could be made that would not only prevent the press from operating but would also cause shorts, stresses and strains, etc., which would ruin the entire machine.

When the men selected were sufficiently expert at forg-



presses, etc. Those decks are probably the most expensively-reinforced concrete slabs in the world today. Result —after the deck was poured, no machine in the entire factory could be operated.

#### *Enemy Reaction*


A Japanese soldier who had graduated from the University of California was sent to investigate and determine who was responsible for the sabotage and how it had been accomplished. As to how it had been accomplished —he had no idea. As to who did it—maybe the Manchurians who had transported the machinery from the old factory site—maybe the Koreans who had disconnected the machinery at the old site and connected it at the new—maybe the Americans who were to operate the machines.

The factory was useless and replacement machinery was not available (a large percentage of the machines bore a

ery, they made the necessary correction to each set of blueprints. Completed work was always checked by supervisors against the plans and was always correct. When the machines failed to operate and in many cases practically disintegrated, the Japanese ranted and raved but they had been made strictly in accordance with the blueprints. Eventually, the whole procedure was taken as a matter of course—make a press, try it, it goes "poof," start over. In June, 1945, the first successful pilot model was tested and the second was scheduled for completion the last week in August. The arrival of Americans by parachute and Russians a couple of days later by land stopped production.

In two and a half years, this factory which employed some 1000 American prisoners of war, 1000 Manchurians, 1000 Koreans and 200 Japanese had turned out one press.

US MC



# The Federals And Fort Fisher

## PART I

*By Maj Edwin H. Simmons*

☛ "SOMETHING MUST BE DONE TO CLOSE THE ENTRANCE to Cape Fear River and port of Wilmington. . . ." confided Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles to his diary on August 30th, 1864. "I have been urging a conjoint attack upon Wilmington for months. Could we seize the forts at the entrance of Cape Fear and close the illicit traffic, it would be almost as important as the capture of Richmond on the fate of the Rebels, and an important step in that direction. But the War Department hangs fire, and the President, whilst agreeing with me, dislikes to press matters when the military leaders are reluctant to move. . ."

Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton was willing in a lukewarm way to cooperate with Welles, but doubted if Grant would favor the expedition and was disinclined to press him. Welles, looking for a way around Stanton, had set his able Assistant Secretary Gustavus V. Fox to work on MajGen Henry W. Halleck, the Army's chief of staff, and also President Lincoln. Lincoln was willing, even solicitous, but, like Stanton deferred to Grant. However, on September 2d, at the subtle insistence of Welles and Fox, the War Department agreed, with some reservations, to a joint operation against the defenses of Wilmington.



## Every principle of modern amphibious warfare was demonstrated in attacks on the South's most formidable bastion. Ship-to-shore assault patterns were established in these 1864 landings by Northern forces on a Carolina beach near Wilmington

This, then, was how the decision was reached for the Union Navy's most ambitious effort in the Civil War. It would result in the greatest concentration of naval strength in the Republic's 88-year history and the strongest earthwork fort in the world would be attacked from the sea. Before they were done they would demonstrate virtually every principle of modern amphibious warfare and it was this campaign, now almost forgotten, not Gallipoli nor Guadalcanal, that established the pattern of amphibious assault as we presently practice it. And, on the other side of the coin, there are lessons, equally valid, on the not-easy technique of base defense.

Gideon Welles had chosen his objective well. Sherman and Grant, hammer and anvil of Northern strategy, had by summer, 1864, almost smashed the Confederacy. The Navy's fantastic close blockade of the South's 3,500 miles of coast line had sealed off, with one exception, the southern ports. The single Atlantic gateway which remained partially ajar, feeding the thin trickle of supplies that kept Johnston and Lee in the field, was Wilmington, North Carolina.

Welles, with a firm decision on the Wilmington operation safe in his pocket, now had to find a leader for the Navy's half of the expedition. Adm Samuel P. Lee, then on station with the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, Welles believed to be "true and loyal, careful, and circumspect almost to a fault, but while vigilant, he has not dash and impetuous daring, and there seems some defect in the blockade which makes Wilmington appear almost a open port. . . ." So Adm Lee, cousin to Robert E. Lee, had to be replaced forthwith.

First and obvious choice for command was Adm David G. Farragut, who Welles said "sees to every movement, forms his line of battle with care and skill, puts himself at the head, carries out his plan, if there is difficulty leads the way, regards no danger to himself, dashes by forts and overcomes obstructions." This was a truly admirable set of characteristics for an attack force commander.

But Farragut declined the command for reasons of "ill health." More important, Farragut, having "damned the torpedoes," was besieging Mobile and the country was momentarily expecting its capture. Actually, the capture of the city of Mobile was not important militarily and Welles knew it. Farragut had already secured the bay and had sliced off Confederate communications. But these strategic niceties were not easily explained, neither to politicians nor the public, and to transfer Farragut would indicate failure at Mobile and advertise intentions against Wilmington.

❖ NEXT TO BE CONSIDERED was Adm S. F. DuPont. But DuPont, in Welles' opinion, had failed miserably at Charleston.

Adm Charles B. Dahlgren, who had the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, was anxious for a change of station. But Welles, while he did not doubt Dahlgren's courage (although he regarded it as artificial), thought the celebrated ordnanceman an evader of responsibility.

Fox, who had a way of cutting through Welles' Gordian knots, had a workable solution: Send Dahlgren west to relieve Adm David D. Porter on the Mississippi, which was by now, thanks largely to Porter, a Yankee creek, and give Porter command of the force against Wilmington. Welles agreed and orders went west to Porter on September 22nd, transferring him from the Mississippi to command of the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

David Dixon Porter was 51, a stocky, square-bearded man, son of Commodore David Porter of 1812 fame and foster brother of Farragut. He arrived with his small personal staff in Washington on October 6th, took one day for briefing by the Navy Department on his new assignment, and sailed on the 7th for Hampton Roads, Virginia.

On the 12th he formally relieved Adm Lee who passed to him a memorandum (addressed to Farragut whom Lee thought would be his relief) giving a full report on the status of the blockade and the preliminary arrangements for the Cape Fear expedition.

The selection of an Army commander was also a problem. The War Department suggested MajGen Quincy A. Gillmore who had been in charge of siege operations against Charleston's harbor defenses the year before and had done well. The hyper-critical Welles thought that Gilmore would make a good second-in-command, particularly as an artillery or engineer officer, but doubted if he had sufficient skill and strength "in organizing and controlling men and planning and carrying out details of an important movement." Consequently, Gilmore did not get the job. Generals Butler and Weitzel did, and this would prove an almost fatal choice.

Benjamin F. Butler was a powerful politician and a pitifully poor soldier. His expedition against Fort Hatteras early in the war had been everything an amphibious operation should not be. (When the fort surrendered on

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*This is the first of a two-part article prepared by Maj Simmons, former Managing Editor of the GAZETTE. After leaving the GAZETTE, he went to AWS-JC, then to Camp Lejeune. He is now a weapons company commander in Korea.*





August 29, 1861, the Confederate commander, Commodore Barron, refused to give his sword to MajGen Butler because the troops ashore had done nothing; he surrendered instead to the naval force commander, Commodore Stringham. Butler had done considerably better as military commander of Baltimore and later of New Orleans—civil administration was one thing he did know—but just now he was in command of the Army of the James and in well over his depth. Grant had specified that the troops for the Wilmington expedition should come from his Army and that Godfrey Weitzel should have command. But Butler saw a chance for glory (“I don’t trust them West Point fellows,” he would say; “they’re trying to keep me from being successful.”) and interposed himself as expeditionary troops commander.

One of Porter’s first actions on taking command was to tighten the Wilmington blockade and to publish a new set of signals. Welles wasn’t quite fair in criticizing S. P. Lee for the “defect” in the blockade because Wilmington presented a peculiar hydrographic problem. The city is fairly well inland on the Cape Fear River which has two entrances, six miles apart by air, but separated by 40 sea miles because of the projection of Smith’s Island and the long Frying Pan Shoals. A complexity of inlets and sand bars further complicated the situation and in addition, blockade running had spawned a special type of low-lying, shallow-draft, paddle steamers of 400 to 600 tons burden, painted dull grey and capable of 14 knots.

Earlier—in fact on September 3d, as soon as he had a decision on the expedition—ruff-bearded old Gideon

Welles had sent Adm S. P. Lee 14 carefully worded, specific questions concerning the hydrography and defenses of the Cape Fear area—we would now call these questions the “essential elements of information.” Whatever the Civil War term was, “circumspect” Adm Lee had done a thorough job, breaking down the questions into detailed indications and assigning them to his subordinate commanders and collecting agencies. The reports, when they were in, were complete—they occupy 12 close-printed pages in the *Official Records*.

Essentially the Confederate defenses of the sea approach to Wilmington were a well-integrated system of coastal batteries and forts. Of these, two, Forts Caswell and Fisher, were major works, and the latter, Fort Fisher, covering the north approach, was the key to the whole position.


IN CHARGE of the Wilmington defenses was MajGen W. H. C. Whiting—Chase Whiting who had been one of Robert E. Lee’s early division commanders, a pessimistic aristocrat and not too popular. Lee, who had recognized both his deep pessimism (not suitable for the Army of Northern Virginia) and his exceptional engineering ability (very much needed for coast defenses), had relieved him of his division and he had been in command of the Wilmington and Cape Fear defenses since November 17, 1862. This had given the man who had graduated first in his class at West Point in 1845 two years to get ready for the Federals. Admittedly, Whiting had his peculiarities. He clashed frequently with his fellow-Mississippian, Jefferson Davis. Dr Freeman, in *Lee’s Lieutenants*, writes of his “endless apprehension, the persistence and the prolixity of Whiting as a correspondent. . .” and that he expected “every day that on the next tide the Federal fleet would arrive off his sand forts.” But a vigilant state of apprehension is not necessarily a bad frame of mind for a base defense force commander.

In immediate command of Fort Fisher was Col William Lamb, a good engineer and officer, who also (fortunately for us considering the paucity of Confederate records) kept a diary.

Gen Braxton Bragg, that controversial figure in the hierarchy of Confederate arms, in November 1864 replaced Gen G. T. Beauregard in the command of the Department of North Carolina and Southern Virginia. This about completes the Confederate command relationships except for BrigGen Louis Hébert, who commanded the Defenses Mouth of Cape Fear River and thus occupied an echelon between Col Lamb and MajGen Whiting.

Physically, Fort Fisher was most impressive. Placed on the low sand spit that is Cape Fear, the fort had two major fronts. The north or land front was 682 yards in length and effectively sealed off the peninsula, there about 700 yards wide. The east or sea front ran 1898 yards down the beach, the two fronts coming together to form a

He wanted an expendable vessel drawing no more than 8½ feet of water and capable of carrying 350 tons of powder. The *Louisiana*, an old screw-driven cotton trade steamer, 150 feet long, filled the bill except that only







Gideon Welles

day, Butler reported to Porter that "the army portion of the conjoint expedition against Wilmington was ready to proceed."

The Navy now interjected further delays into the system. The Army sat waiting aboard its transports over the weekend. On Monday, Porter informed Butler that the naval fleet would sail the

13th but would have to put in at Beaufort, North Carolina, for monitor ammunition.

In an attempt to deceive the enemy, Butler took his transport fleet up the Potomac on Tuesday, the 13th, past Mathias Point. Then, having given Porter 36 hours' start, Butler put to sea on the 14th, arriving in the rendezvous area off New Inlet, near Fort Fisher, on the evening of the 15th. For three days the Army waited for the Navy, the weather the finest possible and the water as smooth as glass.

Porter arrived with his fleet on the evening of the 18th. The powder ship *Louisiana* was supposed to go in that night and she was already on her way when Gen Weitzel came aboard Porter's flagship *Malvern* with a request from Butler that the explosion be delayed. The *Louisiana* was recalled in time and it was just as well, because, after a week of good weather, there was now such a surf running that troops could not have been landed for several days following.

The transports, having 10 days' operation behind them, needed coaling and watering and Porter advised Butler to take his fleet back to Beaufort. Butler did, leaving a single brigade of 1,200 men on station under BrigGen Ames. The weather continued bad until the 23d. When it broke, Butler sent a staff officer on a fast steamer to Porter to advise him that he would again be at the rendezvous on the evening of the 24th, ready to begin the assault, weather permitting.

On the night of December 23-24, Cmdr Rhind, Lt Preston, and 13 enlisted volunteers took the *Louisiana* in to within 300 yards of the beach, dropped her anchors, ac-

tivated her various fuzes, and set the ship on fire. Precisely at midnight the volunteers were taken off by Lt R. H. Lamson in the *Wilderness*, which steamed off at full speed, ran for something less than an hour, hove to, and waited.

For safety's sake Porter had pulled his whole fleet back 12 miles. In his de-

tailed instructions to Cmdr Rhind he optimistically predicted "That houses in Wilmington and Smithfield will tumble to the ground and much demoralize the people, and I think if the rebels fight after the explosion they have more in them than I gave them credit for. . . ."

At 1:40 a.m. December 24th, the powder ship let go. Twelve miles distant the shock was hardly felt by the Union fleet, but with dawn they steamed hopefully forward to survey the destruction.

The extent of the damage can best be described by the later Confederate claim that some of Fort Fisher's defenders weren't even awakened. Col William Lamb, commanding at the fort, reported the explosion to his superiors as a Union gunboat which had run hard aground and destroyed herself.

A year later, before a Congressional investigating committee, Gen Butler was still claiming that if the charges had been properly set, the walls of Fort Fisher would have crumbled.

Regardless of the success or failure of the powder ship explosion, Porter was ready and able to execute the naval half of the attack. Immediately after the explosion, all vessels were to stand inshore and take station as shown on a chart accompanying his General Order No 70, dated December 10, 1864. This divided Porter's fleet, the largest collection of combatant ships ever assembled under the American flag up to this date, into three lines and a reserve. The first line included the five ironclads and was intended for short range fires against the northern face of Fort Fisher. The second and third lines were older ships intended to neutralize the seaward face of the fort. The reserve, held to the rear, consisted of four divisions of light, shallow draft vessels earmarked for the immediate support of the landing force as needed. Essentially a naval gunfire support plan, Porter's General Order No 70 while assigning specific target areas and objectives also provided for considerable flexibility of employment.

❖ FIRE DIRECTION EQUIPMENT making accurate indirect fire possible was of course non-existent, but Porter, as an afterthought, did provide for a rude sort of unobserved fire in a later order in which he directed: "While in action an officer will be kept by the compass to see that the vessel heads the course she anchored on, for, if she should swing in the smoke, broadsides might be fired in the wrong direction.

"This must be allowed for in firing, and when it is no longer possible to see through the smoke the guns must be pointed by compass from on deck."

Porter had a great deal of experience data from previous bombardments upon which to base his naval gunfire plan. Most significant were the results of the bombardment of the Charleston defenses on April 7, 1863, by a

David D. Porter





Union force of nine ironclads and monitors including the redoubtable *New Ironsides*. The Confederate defenses had included three forts and four batteries.

Superficially, the advantage had all been with the Union. The Confederates had had 77 medium guns, nothing bigger than 10-inch. The Federals had 32 heavy guns, 11 and 15 inchers. But during the short action, the Northern ironclads managed to get off only 139 rounds at ranges from 2000 down to 500 yards, scoring 69 hits and causing negligible damage. The Southern batteries, on the other hand, got off 2,229 rounds, scored 520 hits, sinking one Federal ironclad, the *Keokuk*, and damaging six of the remaining eight.


This action demonstrated clearly that the defensive fires of a fortified beach area had to be smothered before the ironclads could be exposed at the short ranges necessary for heavy-caliber destructive fires.

This smothering or neutralization of the beach defenses would require a large number of rapidly firing guns of at least medium, but not necessarily heavy, calibers. The Union had available a number of wooden steam frigates and sloops, made obsolescent by the advent of the ironclads, but mounting most formidable medium-weight broadsides.

Porter planned to mass a tremendous volume of fire by having his heavier vessels anchor within a length of each other. All of this would involve a nicety of maneuvering and considerable risk of the vessels running either afoul of each other or aground.

To prevent the latter, Porter anticipated modern UDT usage and undertook extensive beach reconnaissance under the daring direction of Sub-Assistant J. S. Bradford of the Coast Survey. Two lines of buoys were placed, one at five fathoms, marking the danger limit for the heavier ships, the other at eight feet of water showing the way for smaller vessels.

Butler proposed going ashore between Flag Hill Pond and Half Moon batteries, about four miles north of Fort Fisher's main defenses. He intended sending ashore first a strong reconnaissance party to secure a foothold. If this was found tenable, he wished to land his whole force as rapidly as possible, and then, and only then, "if from the reconnaissance it is deemed practicable to attempt an



assault on Fort Fisher, the assault will be made." He had sufficient small boats (the Army had special landing boats which were better for the purpose than the ships' boats) to land his first "detachment" but requested the Navy supply him with additional small craft including half a dozen or so armed with boat howitzers. He asked that the naval attack be continued and hoped that the fort would be silenced and kept silenced. The exact time of the landing was to be arranged by Gen Weitzel and Adm Porter; Butler suggesting that it be about 8 o'clock.

Altogether, it was a timid, incomplete, inconclusive, and unsatisfactory operation plan.

With daylight on the 24th, Porter got his 50 vessels with their nearly 600 guns underway and in line of battle—somewhat awkwardly because his captains were not used to such close formation fleet maneuvers and also because his ships varied widely in type and steaming characteristics. Leading the line was the first-class ironclad *New Ironsides*, workhorse of the Union fleet, a 3,486-ton steamer with a crew of 376 and 18 guns—14 of them 11-inch shell guns.

At 11:30 Porter made signal to engage the enemy. He could count 17 guns on the fort's northern face. These were silenced almost immediately by the ironclad's fire. In an hour and 15 minutes the entire fort was silent, two magazines had blown up, and the fort was afire in several places. Especially conspicuous were the steam frigates *Minnesota*, *Colorado*, and *Wabash*, each with their heavy broadsides, 11-inch guns, 21 or 23 to a side. Porter ordered the rate of fire to be reduced to moderate until the transports came in.

❖ BUTLER'S FLEET arrived too late in the day to effect a landing. The naval attack was broken off, to be resumed the next morning.

On Christmas morning, Porter began again, his wooden ships at one mile and his iron vessels closing the range to 1200 yards. He shelled Fort Fisher all day with only an occasional Rebel shell in return.

For immediate naval gunfire support in the beachhead area, Porter dispatched 17 shallow draft gunboats (his reserve) under Capt Oliver S. Glisson. Glisson was over-cautious, didn't trust the soundings furnished him, and held his gunboats too far out. Porter sent the big 2,070-ton screw steamer *Brooklyn*, Capt James Alden, to set Glisson a proper example.

Butler's troops got ashore without incident or opposition, the Confederates considerably surrendering the two batteries flanking the beachhead area without firing a shot. Two officers and 65 men were taken prisoner in the Flag Pond Hill battery, seven officers and 218 men in the Half Moon position. All were from the 3d North Carolina Junior Reserves—militia and not proper soldiers at all. From their commander Butler learned that two brigades, Kirkland's and Hagood's, of Hoke's Division, had arrived in Wilmington from Richmond and this sent a chill down his back.


Weitzel pushed his skirmish line to within 50 yards of the land face of the fort, the defenders of which were

prudently in their bombproofs because of the naval gunfire. Three or four Union skirmishers actually reached the parapet, went through a sally port, and took a Confederate flag (a Medal of Honor for that man). A courier was also killed and his horse and dispatches captured.

But darkness was falling and, although he had about 3000 troops ashore, Butler's courage failed him. He figured that with night, the naval gunfire must lift and the guns of the fort would be fully manned again. Of the 17 counted guns on the northern face, protected by their traverses, only two seemed to be dismounted. The sand spit was so narrow that only (sic) 1000 men could advance in line of battle. His engineers told him that Fort Fisher was "substantially uninjured as a defensive work." Butler's conclusions were that nothing short of a regular siege would reduce the fort, there was nothing in his orders authorizing such, so he promptly ordered his troops withdrawn and reembarked for Hampton Roads.

Butler was in such a hurry to get off the beach that he left a regiment or so behind (Naval gunfire could protect them, he said.) The next day Porter sent a dispatch to Capt Alden of the *Brooklyn* which began, "Dear Alden: We must get those poor devils of soldiers off today or lose them. . ." and ended with ". . . ain't a soldier troublesome? Go at it as soon as it is light enough; we can have them all off by 12; there are 700 ashore."

Bad surf delayed things, but Alden had them all off by





the 27th.

No one, on either side, was much hurt by the Christmas Day attack. For two days' operation, Porter had about 45 killed and wounded, most of them from the bursting of temperamental 100-pounder Parrott cannon. Rebel counterfire did little damage. The *Mackinaw* took a hostile shot through her boiler; the *Osceola* nearly sank from a hit near her magazine; there were a few other scattered hits. That was about all.

Ashore, Butler had preserved his reputation gained at Fort Hatteras for bloodless amphibious landings. He reported his losses as "1 man drowned, 2 men killed, 1 officer captured, who accidentally wandered through our pickets, and 10 men wounded while upon the picket-line by the shells of the navy."

The results of the expedition were best summed up by a sentence in Braxton Bragg's General Order No 17:

"One of the most formidable expeditions yet organized by the enemy—an imposing force of veteran troops supported by a fleet carrying over 500 guns—has accomplished no other object than a fruitless landing on a barren coast, followed in forty-eight hours by a hasty re-embarkation."

Bragg had excellent reason to congratulate the defenders of Fort Fisher even though their resistance had been more passive than active.

First definite word of the impending attack had been

clicked off by telegraph to both Whiting and Lee on the 18th of December. Lee considered it imperative to keep Wilmington open. Even though outnumbered two to one on the Richmond-Petersburg front, he detached Hoke's division and sent it south. Robert Hoke's strength returns credited him with 6,155 men. He was a "superlative Colonel and an excellent, hard-hitting Brigadier," but an uncooperative division commander. With the Weldon to Petersburg railroad out, he had a long slow crawl to Wilmington via Danville and Greensboro.

The 24th of December found Col William Lamb in Fort Fisher with 928 defenders, 788 of them regulars, 140 junior reserves. The troop list of his garrison included five companies of the 36th North Carolina Regiment, two veteran artillery companies, F and K, from the 10th North Carolina Regiment, and the 7th Battalion Junior Reserves.

As soon as Whiting heard of the beginning of the bombardment, about 1 p.m. on the 24th, he took a steamer down from Wilmington and joined Lamb in the fort. He did not assume command. He was "a witness simply, confining my action to observation and advice, and to our communications. . ." During the night 24-25 December, when the naval gunfire lifted and the ships withdrew, reinforcements brought the total defenders up to 921 regulars, 450 junior reserves; total, 1371. Also a reinforcement of 60 seamen and marines arrived from Battery Buchanan.

❖ AFTER THE ACTION was completed, Lamb's ordnance sergeant was able to report that 672 rounds of shot and shell had been expended on the 24th, 718 rounds on the 25th. Of these, 118 cartridges were for grape, canister, and shell fired against the landing force and boats.

Lamb's surgeon was pleased to report very light casualties: 23 wounded on the 24th; 3 killed, 35 wounded on Christmas Day. Ten wounded subsequently died.

Whiting's scheme of defense had been classic: light defense of the landing beaches, stubborn defense of the key feature (Fort Fisher), and a strong mobile reserve (Hoke's Division). But the plan was robbed of some of its possible brilliance by errors in execution. Troops defending the landing beaches; i.e., Flag Pond Hill and Half Moon batteries, were evidently lacking in both training and spirit. Fort Fisher apparently did its job well but was not put to the test of an assault. Hoke's Division, at least Kirkland's Brigade, was strangely stagnant. The last did not counter-attack, not even against the remnant left on the beach by Butler Christmas night. At least part of the credit here should go to the naval forces' interdiction fires.

Could Fort Fisher have been taken by assault during the first landing? Porter thought so. Whiting and Butler thought not. Elsewhere there was also divided opinion and dissatisfaction.

To be concluded next month



# Passing in Review

BOOKS OF INTEREST TO MARINE READERS

## Guerrilla Operations . . .

SECRET FORCES—THE TECHNIQUE OF UNDERGROUND MOVEMENTS—LtCol F. O. Miksche, 181 pages, maps and diagrams. London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1950. \$3.50

Guerrilla operations is the official term applied to the type of warfare Col Miksche covers in his latest book. This "unorthodox" warfare has two aspects, the positive and the negative. The author, as the title implies, is mainly interested in the positive—the conduct of guerrilla warfare as a technique—although he enters the realm of higher theory in his penetrating study of the Marxist background of guerrilla warfare as practiced by our opponents in Korea and elsewhere today. The negative aspect of counter-guerrilla operations is given but brief treatment and this only in the broadest terms. This is fortunate for counter-guerrilla operations have been dealt with extensively before both in official and other publications. However, there have been few works, especially in recent years, on the conduct of guerrilla warfare itself and none, to this reviewer's knowledge, that deal with the subject as comprehensively as this.

To know one aspect of guerrilla operations is to at least be fully aware of the other. Counter-guerrilla operations have for years been the forte of the Marine Corps in its role of small war arbiter. In the late war Marine experts with the OSS sparkplugged many native guerrilla operations in all theaters. Marine raider and amphibious reconnaissance parties often operated behind the enemy's lines, alone and with local inhabitants, in what amounted to guerrilla-type operations. In the future Marines will undoubtedly be called upon to perform such tasks again. Any military force, especially in these times, must know how to counter the guerrilla, which our enemy employs so effectively, as well as to derive the maximum benefit from friendly guerrilla forces and even conduct such operations itself. As evidenced by recent articles in the *GAZETTE* on the subject, prominent Marine officers are promoting a re-awakening in the Corps both to the necessity of effectively countering the guerrilla menace as well as to the beneficial cooperation with friendly guerrillas and to the role of a balanced, highly trained and mobile striking force such as the Marine Corps in guerrilla-type operations on a large scale. No officer today can lay claim

to professional well-roundedness unless he understands not only the technique of guerrilla and counter-guerrilla but also the impact of this old but increasingly important means of war on orthodox military operations and foreign policy. This book is calculated to do just this.

In his historical outline of the subject the author gives particular emphasis to the importance attached to guerrilla operations in both Marxist theory and practice and answers the question of the increased importance these operations play in today's world scene. This is of particular significance at this time with friendly forces fighting Communist guerrillas in Malaya, Indo-China and Indonesia and Marine units in the Korean fight against Communist regular and guerrilla forces. The author continues with the strategic elements of guerrilla operations, their dependence on regular forces and outside aid, and the factors of local terrain, politics, economics, traditions, and character. With this background laid he gets down to cases with the tactics and techniques of guerrilla operations; organization, communications, intelligence, propaganda, sabotage, strikes, and open fighting. As mentioned before, counter-guerrilla is left to the last and given a much briefer treatment. However, one portion of this chapter of interest to Marines is his mention of the use of helicopter-borne forces in surprise attacks of guerrilla concentrations and in routine counter-guerrilla patrolling.

LtCol Miksche will be remembered for his *Blitzkrieg* (*Attack* was the American title), an analysis of German armored tactics based on his observations in Spain, Poland, and France, and *Paratroops*, a work of similar pattern on airborne operations. His recent *War Between Continents*, coauthored with Col Combaux of the French army, is a prognostication of the possible course of World War III, probable strategies, and the effects of new techniques on tactics.

LtCol Miksche was in the pre-Munich and post-World War II Czechoslovakian armies and is now a refugee. He fought in the Spanish Civil War where he first encountered communist underground activities. In the late war he was Director of Operations for Gen de Gaulle's Secret Service which ran the French underground. Rejoining Czech forces, he again came in contact with the guerrilla forces of Communism in Central Europe.

Reviewed by LtCol F. B. Nihart



## Royal Marines . . .

THE MARINES WERE THERE—Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, K.C.M.G. 210 pages, index, maps. Putnam and Co., London. 12/6.

Here is a book that in an easy, chatty style gives the story of the Royal Marines' activities in World War II. The author does not contend that the Royal Marines won the war, but he shows by the record that there were few places on Britain's far-flung battle fronts which did not have some representatives of the Royals who always did their job smartly and well in accordance with the traditions of their famous Corps.

There is much human interest in this story and, thanks to the annual visit to Quantico by the English lecture team from the School of Combined Operations, some of the people mentioned are not entirely unfamiliar. After a brief introductory skirmish of a couple of chapters to rough-in the Royal Marines' past history, the author picks up the thread of his tale when World War II opened in September of 1939 and the strength of that Corps stood at some 12,000 officers and men. Their exploits during the next six years on the land, on the sea, and in the air are bound to evoke professional admiration. The ill-starred campaign in Norway found the Royals bearing a hand as usual and under very difficult circumstances too. The most appealing incident to come out of this venture concerns Capt Wilson RM and his detachment at Nasmos.

"Ordered to withdraw immediately and to leave his guns and equipment, he replied that he would evacuate at all speed, but would bring his guns with him. A second signal warned him that the destroyer would not wait. Unperturbed, Capt Wilson proceeded with his task, and, by commandeering every boat he could lay his hands on, succeeded in bringing away every gun and every man of his battery. Having kept the destroyers waiting for twenty minutes, he was asked for an explanation. His answer was terse. 'It is not the policy of the Corp,' he said, 'to leave its equipment in enemy hand.'"

Together with a mixed battalion from the Brigade of Guards, the Royal Marines covered the evacuation of the Queen of the Netherlands and her government from Holland when the spectacular rush of the German armies endangered their safety. They were at Calais and Dunkirk; they took part in the Dakar operation and served in Egypt. They fought valiantly in Crete and helped cover the evacuation with a series of desperate rear-guard actions. When the British ships were forced to leave the island, one enterprising Royal Marine officer gathered up a mixed bag of stragglers, found an old LCM, and, with extraordinary ingenuity, sailed the whole lot to North Africa.

The fall of Singapore found the Royal Marines fighting

shoulder to shoulder with a battalion of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. They left their mark at Madagascar; in the Middle East; and at Dieppe where their gallantry was in the best tradition of the Corps. Sicily and Italy knew the Royal Marines, as did Normandy, France, and Germany. At Walcheren they accomplished a mission that for sheer courage is fit to be mentioned with the famed Zeebrugge raid of World War I. They fought a whole series of sharp actions in the Arakan in Burma. When the war ended the strength of the Corps was almost 80,000 and they were preparing to take a part in the assault on Singapore.

But this quick run-through of geographical names I have given you here does not begin to cover all the places and all the things that are part and parcel of the story of the Royal Marines in the war just past. For example, I have not said anything about partisan operations along the Adriatic and in Greece, nor has there been any mention of a series of individual exploits like Maj H. G. Hasler's canoe trip up the Gironde River into the very heart of enemy shipping for the purpose of putting a few mines where they would do the most good; nor has there been any mention of Royal Marine operations at sea and in the air. You must read the book yourself and I assure you it will be time well spent.

*The Marines Were There* was written by Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, who was Director-General of the Political Warfare Executive during the war. He has done a remarkably good job in tying all the multitudinous war-time activities of the Royal Marines into a connected, smoothly-told, easily-read story.

It has always been a source of satisfaction to me, but more so in these parlous times just now, that the Corps badge of the Royal Marines incorporates the Eastern

## Famous American Marines

Have you seen *Famous American Marines* by Charles Lee Lewis? This is a book every Marine will want to read and add to his collection. Famous old names come to life again in the pages of Professor Lewis' book, names like Nicholas, O'Bannon, Henderson, Zeilin, Butler, Neville, Lejeune, Vandegrift, Smith, and Geiger, just to name a few. With 19 illustrations and 355 pages of easily-read text, *Famous American Marines* promises you many hours of interest and enjoyment. \$3.75

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hemisphere, while our corresponding emblem uses the Western hemisphere. It would seem that the whole world is thus well in the hands of what, except for modesty, I would be inclined to call elite troops.

Reviewed by LtCol R. McC. Tompkins

CAPTAIN SAM GRANT; Lloyd Lewis; 512 pp.; Little, Brown and Co., Boston. \$6.00

This book is not, nor was it intended to be, a complete biography of U. S. Grant. Rather, it is the first volume of what was to be a complete and detailed coverage of U. S. Grant's life but for the untimely death of the author.

The volume covers Grant's life from date of birth to his appointment as a colonel in June of 1861. The early part of his life is covered in great detail with the obvious purpose of laying a firm cornerstone upon which to base the succeeding volumes.

Mr Lewis used every opportunity to introduce those contemporaries of Grant's who were to play a major part in his later life. This is particularly true of the period Grant spent at the Academy and during the Civil War. These thumb-nail sketches are expertly done and skillfully introduced.

Much of the military value of this book lies in the presentation of the Mexican War. The political implications of this period are of particular interest. An early indication of Grant's courage and initiative is brought out in this period. Although Grant was assigned a billet comparable to our regimental S-4, he often went forward and conspicuously joined the front line troops in their assaults.

It is interesting to note that many of the problems facing the military personnel of today obtained during Grant's day, i.e., promotion, resignation, and pay. In an effort to augment his Captain's salary (677 dollars a year) and to raise enough money to have his wife join him on the west coast, Grant entered several abortive "business deals." One of these ventures involved the planting of approximately one hundred acres of potatoes that were to be sold in the rich San Francisco market. In later life Grant wrote about it with humor:

"Our crop was enormous. Luckily for us the Columbia River rose to a great height from the melting of the snow in the mountains in June, and overflowed and killed most of our crop. This saved digging it up, for everybody on the Pacific Coast seemed to have come to the conclusion at the same time that agriculture would be profitable. . . . The only potatoes we sold were to our own mess."

Grant was never successful in getting his wife to the West Coast. This fact was undoubtedly one of the underlying reasons why Grant submitted his resignation on

11 April 1854. Although Mr Lewis refrained from drawing a positive conclusion that Grant was forced to resign because of excessive drinking he did submit enough evidence to leave little doubt in the reader's mind that it was the causation of Grant's resignation.

Mr Lewis has added much to the understanding of U. S. Grant. He had worked exclusively for five years on Grant's life before writing this volume. This is reflected in the documentation of the book, approximately 59 pages being devoted to footnotes. A serious student of history would be well rewarded by reading this book.

Reviewed by Maj T. H. Fisher

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
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## THE PRESS

### *Esprit de Corps*

Nine months ago, the editors of the *Marine Corps Gazette* set their goal. To help mark the Corps' 175th anniversary this week, they planned "to produce an accurate, concise and readable history of the Marine Corps that would definitely establish some of the word-of-mouth history and tradition." Last week, in a special, 136-page anniversary issue priced at \$1 (regular price: 30¢), the *Gazette* published a "readable history" that was also a gusty, colorful explanation of the unique *esprit de corps* that distinguishes the U.S. Marines from other U.S. armed services.

Like the Corps, the monthly *Gazette* has earned a solid reputation of its own. Started in 1916 as a semiofficial organ, the magazine's circulation has climbed from 744 in 1932 to its present 18,000, now numbers among its subscribers 28 foreign governments, including the Soviet Union (six copies). A rotating board of editors, all Marine officers, gives its articles on battle tactics, training methods and other aspects of military science an authoritative tone. The *Gazette*, which is wholly self-supporting, also plays an important role in the continuous indoctrination of Marines, never lets them forget their blood & glory-starred history. Some of it, as recounted in the anniversary issue:

¶ When a Navy officer insulted a Marine, William Ward Burrows, first official commandant of the Marines, wrote to his Marine officer: "... Don't let me see you 'till you have wiped away this disgrace. It is my duty to support my officers and I will do it with my life, but they must deserve it."

¶ In 1836, when Commandant Archibald

Henderson headed for battle with 700 Marines (half the entire Corps), he tacked a laconic sign on his office door: "Gone to Florida to fight the Indians. Will be back when the war is over." When Henderson retired after 38 years as commandant, he was so accustomed to living in the commandant's house that he tried to will it to his heirs.

¶ At Belleau Wood, Gunnery Sergeant Dan Daly, twice winner of the Medal of Honor\* (Boxer Rebellion and Haiti), was reported to have said: "Come on, you sons of bitches! Do you want to live forever?" But profane old Dan Daly [shaken by reports that the Corps was going to be politer] grimly insisted that what he said was: "For goodness sake, you chaps, let us advance against the foe!"

¶ Col. Frederic W. Wise (who claimed that during World War I he had originated the phrase: "Retreat, hell—we just got here!") once heard his men had coined a nickname for him. He lined them up and shouted: "I hear you so-and-sos have taken to calling me 'Dopey.' All right; only don't forget that I'm also Wise."

¶ The late Major General Smedley D. Butler, made a captain at 19 for bravery during the Boxer Rebellion, once walked alone into a rebel camp during a Nicaraguan revolution, seized the rebel general by his mustache, and ended the revolt. Years later, having retired after an uproar over his burning criticisms of Mussolini, he wrote an article [for *Liberty*] entitled "To Hell with the Admirals."